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Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored:
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Bringing
Unjust Enrichment Claims Under ICSID
ANA VOHRYZEK *
I. INTRODUCTION
Most scholars, arbitrators, and international lawyers, if
pushed, would not be able to answer a simple question: "Does
unjust enrichment play a role in the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")?" This Article seeks
both to answer this question and to outline a future role for unjust
enrichment in ICSID.
While past ICSID tribunals have not explicitly endorsed
unjust enrichment, they have repeatedly relied on it. Importantly,
ICSID tribunals' unacknowledged reliance on unjust enrichment
has led to misapplication and confusing awards. The Article argues
that the most effective way to resolve the issue is for ICSID
tribunals to explicitly recognize unjust enrichment. In addition,
tribunals' de facto use of unjust enrichment supports the idea that
unjust enrichment is a principle of international law that future
ICSID tribunals may recognize. Specifically, the Article
reexamines cases like Chorzow' and ADC v. Hungary' and
maintains that they rely on unjust enrichment.
The Article reviews the role of unjust enrichment in
international and domestic law. Unjust enrichment is a principle
• Ana Vohryzek graduated from Yale Law School in May 2009. She is currently working
with Eduardo Zuleta, an international arbitrator, in Bogota, Colombia. In January 2010,
she joins Latham & Watkins, San Francisco. She would like to thank Sergey Ripinsky,
with whom she worked at the British Institute for International and Comparative Law,
and professors Michael Reisman and Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez for their invaluable
guidance and support throughout the process.
1. Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
2. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award).
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respected by most domestic legal codes and many international
forums (e.g., Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal), and thus is arguably a
principle of customary international law. While the exact details of
unjust enrichment differ slightly between countries, the principle,
its applicability, and its general parameters are substantially the
same. The Article considers that since the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal provided a set of parameters that reflect widely agreed
upon principles, these parameters represent a good synopsis of
relevant customary international law.
The Article concludes that unjust enrichment might be
brought as a cause of action under the fair and equitable treatment
standard in bilateral investment treaties. Lastly, the Article
attempts to show that since unjust enrichment is a cause of action,
it may prove instrumental in cases involving intellectual property
disputes.
As mentioned above, the examination of current international
law reveals a pattern of lawyers and tribunals carelessly employing
unjust enrichment. The pattern appears self-perpetuating.
International lawyers undermine unjust enrichment standards by
using it indiscriminately, which in turn ensures that tribunals view
the concept as a weak ploy, long depreciated by casual use.
Despite this degradation, unjust enrichment remains a useful tool
if used precisely and sparingly. Indeed, it is so useful that tribunals
such as ADC v. Hungary employ it, even if they call it something
else.3 As well, awarding just remedies requires consistent and
precise application of legal concepts. Consistent interpretation and
application of unjust enrichment can help shape the conduct of
potential litigants by cementing the expectations of the parties.
The sloppy use of unjust enrichment, therefore, degrades both the
concept itself and related ideas that misappropriate the idea to fill
legal lacunae. This applies particularly to international
investments, which engender high levels of interdependence and
reliance. Thus, disciplined unjust enrichment claims would be a
useful part of international investment tribunals' "fair and
equitable treatment standard" tool kit. Indeed, if applied with
precision, unjust enrichment may be used as an effective cause of
action and remedial measure in ICSID disputes.
Each piece of the argument requires extended independent
exploration. Because connecting the disparate elements of the
3. See id. 484-485.
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argument at the beginning will facilitate better understanding
throughout the Article, a brief summary of the argument follows.
Unjust enrichment can be categorized as a general principle of law
as that term is used under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.' Viewed en masse, the use of unjust
enrichment in international arbitration decisions, including Lena
Goldfields5 and Chorz6w Factory,6 establishes its pride of place as
a general principle of customary international law. Establishing
unjust enrichment as a legal principle included in the corpus of
customary international law provides claimants protection from
unjust enrichment under bilateral investment treaties ("BITs").
This protection manifests as follows. BITs house a limited number
of protections, all of which are agreed upon before signing.7 These
protections include, among others, compensation for expropriation
and fair and equitable treatment requirements.8 Fair and equitable
treatment is a catchall requiring, at a minimum, that a signatory
State not violate principles of customary international law with
respect to investors from another signatory State.' Once it is
shown that unjust enrichment is a principle of customary
international law, unjust enrichment then falls under the umbrella
protection of the fair and equitable treatment clause contained in
most BITs.
Due to the idiosyncratic nature of unjust enrichment and the
possibility of abuse, the concept's intrinsic restrictions must
influence both the way in which a claimant brings an unjust
enrichment claim under the fair and equitable treatment clause
and the subsequent remedy. One should think of the fair and
equitable treatment clause as housing an unjust enrichment claim.
Thus, an unjust enrichment claim needs to be proved on its own
merits. Once the tribunal determines that there is reasonable
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
.1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] ("The Court, whose function it is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply ... the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations .....
,5. The Lena Case, THE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1930, at 7.
6. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
7. See U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, U.S. Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program Fact Sheet, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2008/22422.htm;
see also, e.g., Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, 6 ICSID (W. Bank)
310 (2004) (Decision on Award of March 15, 2002).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., R.H. Kreindler, Fair and Equitable Treatment - A Comparative
International Law Approach, 3(3) J. TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT. 2,8-9 (2006).
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belief that an unjust enrichment occurred, the claim would satisfy a
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. This two-
tiered structure is required in large part because unjust enrichment
is based purely on what the defendant gained, so both the analysis
and the remedy are distinct from other causes of action. This
dovetails with the need to discipline the application of unjust
enrichment.
In addition to qualifying as part of the fair and equitable
treatment standard's menu of protected rights, unjust enrichment
is also able to surmount the significant jurisdictional barriers
ICSID presents. Hence, it is a valid claim under ICSID. Lastly,
since unjust enrichment claims generally allow only one remedy-
restitution -o-restitution should be the only remedy available to
successful unjust enrichment claims brought under the fair and
equitable treatment clause, even if the treaty allows for other
remedies.
Overall, the argument begins with basic definitions and builds
slowly thereupon. Broadly speaking, Part II explores unjust
enrichment parameters, sets out an international standard, and
introduces past cases. Part II.A defines unjust enrichment and sets
out universal parameters stemming from the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal and domestic legal codes. Part II.B reviews the treatment
of unjust enrichment in international law. First, it demonstrates
that preventing unjust enrichment is a general principle of law.
From there, by surveying cases and scholars, it is shown that unjust
enrichment is not only a general principle of law, but also a
principle of customary international law. The international law
survey opens with the history of unjust enrichment in international
claims tribunals, focusing on Chorz6w Factory" in Part II.B.2 and
ADC v. Hungary'y in Part II.B.3. This Article demonstrates that
the oft-cited Chorz6w Factory offers unjust enrichment as a
remedy, and that some cases, such as ADC v. Hungary, cite to it
relying on unspoken ideas of unjust enrichment. Part II.B.4 briefly
examines unjust enrichment language in ICSID cases-to assess
the current role unjust enrichment plays in ICSID decision-
10. See generally Brice Dickson, Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Comparative Overview,
54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 100 (1995).
11. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
12. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award).
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* making. Part II.B.5 discusses the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which
provides guidance on applying unjust enrichment internationally.
Finally, Part III uses a sweep of hypotheticals based on the
Mihaly v. Sri Lanka'3 fact pattern to explore jurisdictional
thresholds, merits-based limitations, and general boundaries for a
future claimant bringing an unjust enrichment claim under ICSID.
II. HISTORY
A. Defining Unjust Enrichment
Understanding unjust enrichment is essential. The wide range
of interpretations and debates surrounding the concept, as well as
the multi-faceted role the term "unjust enrichment" plays in legal
rhetoric, complicate comprehension. Hence, appreciating unjust
enrichment entails a broad and at times frustratingly inconclusive
examination.
Unjust enrichment can be defined as:
1. The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without
offering compensation, in circumstances where compensation is
reasonably expected. 2. A benefit obtained from another, not
intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the
beneficiary must make restitution or recompense. 3. The area of
law dealing with unjustifiable benefits of this kind."
It is also defined as "[a] legal doctrine stating that if a person
receives money or other property through no effort of his own, at
the expense of another, the recipient should return the property to
the rightful owner, even if the property was not obtained
illegally."'" As well, "[a]lthough unjust enrichment may arise from
fraud or several other predicates, the element of fraud or tortious
conduct on the part of a defendant is not necessary in an action for
unjust enrichment .... A person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other." 6
In the second and fifth definitions, unjust enrichment invokes
two separate concepts. One is a causative event resulting in "unjust
enrichment," and the other is the remedy-restitution. Restitution
13. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573-74 (8th ed. 2004).'
15. Nolo.com, http://www.nolo.com/definition.cfmrTerm/D87B554E-A16D-4320-
81572AA5FB784730/alpha/U/.
16. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 12 (2001).
2009] 505
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simply means returning something to the owner or person entitled
to it. Restitution, employed as a legal remedy, is based upon
returning gains, unlike compensation for damages, which is
founded upon the plaintiff's loss.' 7 Unjust enrichment, then, is
both what the claim is based on, and the amount by which the
defendant was unjustly enriched. Accordingly, a claim for unjust
enrichment can be either a separate cause of action or a measure
of and justification for an award.
Restitution and unjust enrichment are inextricably
intertwined. While the principle of unjust enrichment underlies
restitution claims, restitution as a remedy is available where unjust
enrichment is not the cause of action (at least in common law
countries). Two causes of action can trigger restitution: wrongs
committed and unjust enrichment. "9 Generally, in a claim based on
wrongs committed, compensation is awarded according to the loss
suffered (compensatory damages). 2 In some instances, however,
the loss is speculative or unsubstantiated, leaving the plaintiff
without compensation. Courts may remedy this by measuring
damages based on the respondent's "unjust" gains, also known as
restitution. 21
Alternatively, courts allow claims whose sole cause of action
is unjust enrichment. In this instance, restitution is the only
remedy permitted. While British courts allow plaintiffs to choose
unjust enrichment as a remedy in cases where it provides greater
compensation than loss-based alternatives,2 2 some countries only
allow restitution when it would award less than a loss-based
17. 42 C.J.S. Implied and Constructive Contracts § 10 (2007) ("The fundamental
substantive basis for restitution is that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by
receiving something, tangible or intangible, that properly belongs to the plaintiff.
Restitution rectifies unjust enrichment by restoring the other to the position he or she
formerly occupied either by the return of something he or she formerly occupied either by
the return of something he or she formerly hand or by the receipt of its equivalent in
money. In order to recover under a theory of restitution, the plaintiff must show that he or
she conferred a nongratuitous benefit on the defendant; the defendant realized some value
from the benefit, and it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without paying the plaintiff for its value. A benefit which may warrant restitution may be
any type of advantage such as that which saves the recipient from any loss or expense.").
18. See Dickson, supra note 10 at 104.
19. See ANDREW BURROWS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 5-16, 929 (2d ed. 2006).
20. A-G v. Blake, [20001 UKHL 45, t2001] 1 A.C. 268 (appeal taken from Eng.).
21. See, e.g., id.; Field Common Ltd. v. Elmbridge Borough Council, [2008] W.L.
3819539 T 58-61 (Ch.).
22. See Dickson, supra note 10, at 105-06, 116.
506 [Vol. 31:501
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remedy. ' The most significant distinction is between the limited
French code compensation method (restitution of the loss) and the
common law concept of disgorgement, which includes restitution
of the loss plus any additional benefits. ' While divergences do
exist, and ultimately a choice must be made with respect to
disgorgement, unjust enrichment looks much the same across
countries as all impose the same general parameters.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice simply requires that court apply "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations."' Thus, inter-
country differences that do not impact the principle itself do not
undermine unjust enrichment's position as a general principle of
international law under Article 38(1). Indeed, it is almost certain
that every country provides for any given cause of action slightly
differently. Part II.B, below, introduces some national parameters
of unjust enrichment.
1. Domestic Legal Codes: Unjust Enrichment
Common law countries differ slightly in their understanding
of the details of unjust enrichment. 26 Unlike English law, U.S. law
explicitly requires a connection between loss and gain. 27 If
23. France is one such example. Id. at 113-15.
24. 66 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 16, § 1 ("The word 'restitution' was used in the earlier
common law to denote the return or restoration of a specific thing or condition. In modern
legal usage, its meaning has frequently been extended to include not only the restoration
or giving back of something to its rightful owner and returning to the status quo, but also
compensation, reimbursement, indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from,
or for loss or injury caused to, another.").
25. ICJ Statute, supra note 4.
26. Four stages of analysis guide most English lawmakers: (1) Was the defendant
enriched? (2) Was the enrichment at the expense of the claimant? (3) Was the enrichment
unjust? (4) Does the defendant have a defense? Each stage presents complications
domestically, not to mention internationally. Enrichment, for example, could be both
tangible (monetary) and intangible (use of a nature reserve). And who determines when
enrichment is "unjust," particularly since it does not require wrongdoing or illegality?
English law relies on the following factors to determine unjust enrichment: mistake of fact,
mistake of law, duress, undue influence, total failure of consideration, and miscellaneous
policy-based unjust factors such as "withdrawal in the locus poenitentiae." English law also
relies on ignorance or powerlessness, unconscionability, partial failure of consideration,
and absence of consideration. These last four, however, are more controversial. See
generally Peter Birks, The English Recognition of Unjust Enrichment, L.M.C.L.Q. 473
(1991).
27. The United States bases its legal framework on the Restatement (3d) of
Restitution. In practice, courts look to satisfy five components: (1) an enrichment, (2) an
impoverishment, (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4)
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
interpreted like French civil law, that connection must be direct.'
Another distinction is that English law asks what remedies should
be applied, whereas U.S. law seeks "an absence of a remedy."'2 9
The implication is that, in contrast to English courts, U.S. courts
(and French courts3") use unjust enrichment only where no other
claim can be made.
Lastly, where U.S. courts increasingly use "absence of
justification for enrichment" standard, England employs, "was the
enrichment unjust?"3 Again, U.S. usage parallels the civil law
approach. The "enrichment unjust" approach requires the claimant
to identify at least one specific factor legally recognized as
rendering the defendant's enrichment unjust.32 On the contrary,
the U.S. "absence of justification" approach identifies enrichments
with no legitimate explanatory basis, without looking to black-
letter legal factors." Scholars, however, remark that there is
actually very little difference between the two approaches. '
U.S. treatment of unjust enrichment mirrors France in all but
one key area, disgorgement. Modern French textbooks generally
agree that an unjust enrichment claim must satisfy five
prerequisites:
1. the plaintiff's loss must be a direct or indirect consequence of
the defendant's enrichment, though the defendant can be
required to pay only the lesser of the plaintiff's loss or the
defendant's own enrichment;
2. the plaintiff must not have been at fault;
absence of a justification for the enrichment and impoverishment (also known as "was the
enrichment unjust?"), and (5) absence of a remedy provided by law. Schroeder v.
Buchholz, 2001 ND 32, 622 N.W.2d 210.
28. "A connection between loss and impoverishment" resembles French law's "the
plaintiff's loss must be a direct or indirect consequence of the defendant's enrichment."
See infra Part II.A.1.
29. Schroeder, 2001 ND 32.
30. Dickson, supra note 10, at 113.
31. ANDREW BURROWS, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 7 (CLARENDON
PRESS 1991).
32. See Mindy Chen-Wishart, In Defence of Unjust Factors: A Study of Rescission for
Duress, Fraud and Exploitation, in UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT: KEY ISSUES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 159, 159-60 (David Johnston & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2002) (comparing the German and English laws, and remarking that there is actually
very little difference between the two approaches).
33. Id.
34. Id. (comparing German law, which the U.S. approach approximates, and English
law, and remarking that there is actually very little difference between the two
approaches).
508 [Vol. 31:501
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3. the plaintiff must not have acted in his or her own interest;
4. neither the enrichment nor the related impoverishment must
be legally justifiable... ;
5. no other remedy than the action de in rem verso must be
available in law for the kind of loss in question.
French courts allow the plaintiff "only the lesser of the plaintiff's
loss or defendant's own enrichment." 3 6 Hence, the award is capped
at the amount of the plaintiff's loss. This means that French
parameters do not allow for disgorgement of profits. " Conversely,
U.S. law, while requiring some loss, does not limit the quantum of
the award to the plaintiff's loss, but rather uses the defendant's
gain to set the quantum limit. 8 This distinction has substantial
practical implications, as the quantum under each approach may
vary wildly. Thus, a choice must be made as to which country's
standard to follow, the more limited award or the more expansive.
In contrast, other European countries' civil codes permit and
inspire compromise. Italian unjust enrichment law, for example,
resembles French law quantum limitations, but appears to create a
carve out for bad faith, "the defendant must pay the lesser of the
impoverishment suffered by the plaintiff or the enrichment
enjoyed by the defendant: only if the defendant has acted in bad
faith is the defendant fully liable.",
3
35. Dickson, supra note 10, at 113 (first emphasis added).
36. Id. at 114.
37. In addition, the French preclude any cases where the plaintiff benefited or was at
fault. Consequently, this prima facie excludes any case involving illegal activity or gain by
the plaintiff. Dickson explains that the French notion of faute (fault) "is wider than the
notion of negligence in English law. It embraces intentional as well as merely careless
conduct .... A plaintiff who is in breach of contract cannot therefore claim restitution
against the other contracting party and a plaintiff who compromises an honest claim
cannot later try to get out of the arrangement by claiming restitution of benefits
conferred." Id. at 114-15. In the context of prerequisite (3), "the plaintiff must not have
acted in his or her own interest," Dickson continues, exploring the wide notion of faute.
"[A] plaintiff who undertakes work for his or her own benefit cannot claim restitution
from a defendant who also happens, whether accidentally or not, to benefit from the
work." Id. at 115.
38. See Schroeder, 2001 ND 32, 14 ("The essential element in recovering under a
theory of unjust enrichment is the receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff
which would be inequitable to retain without paying for its value." (internal quotations
and citation omitted)).
39. Dickson, supra note 10 at 118 ("[T]here must be a causal nexus between the
plaintiff's impoverishment and the defendant's enrichment, as well as absence of any good
legal reason for either phenomenon .... The defendant cannot claim an allowance for
payments he or she has had to make by virtue of receiving the enrichment, nor can the
defendant claim compensation for improvements. The defendant is liable even if he or she
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The German code for unjust enrichment, however, nearly
parallels the Anglo-American code. 4 German scholars identify
two types of unjust enrichment claims: Eingriffskondiktionen
(unlawful interference) and Leistungskondiktionen (performance
derived).' Each type elicits different legal treatment.
Leistungskondiktionen applies to frustrated/defective contracts. 2
The law requires that restitution occur even when a "legal
justification existed for the enrichment at the time of its
occurrence but has later disappeared or when an anticipated
purpose to be fulfilled but the performance does not materialise."'
More importantly, Eingriffskondiktionen does not "presuppose
that the plaintiff suffers a loss.. .. A person who uses a machine,
which otherwise would have been lying idle, is therefore liable
under this head."" The German conception of unjust enrichment
compensation must mirror the Anglo-American idea of
disgorgement-if no loss is required to find unjust enrichment, it
follows that loss cannot limit the award.
2. International Unjust Enrichment: Creating Universal
Parameters
Exploring national parameters leaves us, at a stalemate
regarding disgorgement. Because the amount awarded under
disgorgement could be markedly greater than that reflected solely
in the plaintiff's loss, leaving the matter open would breed
inconsistencies, as explored later, inconsistency undermines
expectations, and weakens the concept itself. As well, participants
should know which remedy is appropriate. As international law
expands, precision in awards acquires utmost importance, and
national conceptions of a concept should not impact quantum.
Thus, some determination must be made ex ante. Past practice
provides minimal guidance on the matter. The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal employs U.S. parameters, lending some small support to
is an indirect beneficiary of enrichment ... and even if the plaintiff, in paying money that
was not due the defendant, made no mistake." (internal citations omitted)); see also
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] arts. 2041-42 (Italy).
40. Dickson, supra note 10 at 119.
41. Id. at 120.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 121.
510 [Vol. 31:501
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the idea of disgorgement. 5 All of the cases therein, however, could
be considered to reflect the overlap between the plaintiff's loss and
defendant's gain.
The civil law option is the consensus option-all countries
agree that unjust enrichment includes the overlap between
plaintiff's loss and defendants gain. Nevertheless, international
tribunals are currently awarding disgorgement without using the
language of unjust enrichment. This indicates that tribunals see a
necessity for disgorgement in set circumstances and may award
disgorgement whether or not it is expressly permitted.
As a result, use of the common law and German option is
sensible and justifiable. First, the common law option includes the
French conception. Selecting the French award method by itself
would preclude elements of the common law option
(disgorgement). With a more expansive option, jurists can take
into account contributing factors, and limit the award accordingly.
Indeed, most common law scholars and courts factor in
considerations such as bad faith and ignorance.6 Conversely,
upfront limitations may handicap jurists. As well, some
international cases seem to include the idea of disgorgement. 
7
As explored below, the area in which unjust enrichment has
real utility is intellectual property dispute resolution. In
intellectual property cases, the amount gained often far surpasses
the amount lost. Unjust enrichment is, therefore, an apt remedy
because it allows for the disgorgement of profits. Know-how is
very difficult to price, and an idea without action may be
worthless. Thus, limiting the amount awarded to the plaintiff's loss
would cripple the utility of unjust enrichment, and make
determining the quantum extremely difficult. For intellectual
property cases, then, there will be an efficiency loss, as plaintiffs
must prove both the elusive quantum of the loss and of the gain. If
a significant loss occurred, a tribunal could, of course, cap the
award at that amount. A tribunal should not, however, be limited
in such a manner.
45. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is an international arbitral tribunal
established January 19, 1981 between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The tribunal's cases are located in the Iran-U.S. CTR Reports (28 volumes). Background
Information: Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org/background-
english.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2009). Some of the cases are explored infra Part II.B.5.
46. See infra Part III.
47. The International Court of Justice's "takings cases," such as Papamichalopoulos
v. Greece, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 36-45 (1996), are one example.
2009]
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. Thus, this Article assumes that unjust enrichment includes the
possibility of disgorgement of profits above and beyond the loss
suffered. Although making an admittedly arbitrary decision invites
discomfort, having a single, universally applied conception of
unjust enrichment is critical. International investment disputes are
sufficiently confusing without the added contributions of
ambiguous tenets of legal concepts.
For clarity (and because the exploration is in the context of
ICSID), the definition relied on by a few of the ICSID tribunals
will be used. These tribunals borrowed their definition from the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, thus it reflects U.S. unjust
enrichment tenets:
The concept of unjust enrichment is recognized as a general
principle of international law. It gives one party a right of
restitution of anything of value that has been taken or received
by the other party without a legal justification. As the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal has stated more specifically:
There must have been an enrichment of one party to the
detriment of the other, and both must arise as a consequence
of the same act or event. There must be no justification for the
enrichment, and no contractual or other remedy available to
the injured party whereby he might seek compensation from
the party enriched. 48
Thus, there are five requirements in an unjust enrichment claim:
(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection
between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) absence of a
justification for the enrichment and the impoverishment (this has
also been stated as "was the enrichment unjust?" 49), and (5)
absence of a remedy provided by the law. "
48. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, 449 (Partial Award, registered with
Perm Ct. Arb. Mar. 17,2006).
49. While U.S. courts are increasingly using the "absence of justification for
enrichment" approach, England employs the "was the enrichment unjust" approach. U.S.
usage mimics the civil law approach. The "enrichment unjust" approach requires the
claimant to identify at least one specific factor legally recognized as rendering the
defendant's enrichment unjust. On the contrary, the "absence of justification approach"
identifies enrichments with no legitimate explanatory basis without looking to black-letter
legal factors.
50. Schroeder, 2001 ND 32, T15. These tenets have been explored and upheld in other
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases, such as Future Trading, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Auth., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 46 (1985) and Schlegel Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian
Copper Indus., 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 176 (1981).
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There are a number of defenses to unjust enrichment claims.
Complete defenses defeat the whole claim, whereas partial
defenses reduce the value of the claim. Defenses include: change
of position, agency/ministerial receipt, bona fide purchase for
value without notice (not available to defendants who were
enriched directly from the claimant), counter-restitution, and
illegality.5 Each of these defenses will be briefly defined, in turn.
"Change of position" reduces the value of the claim against
the defendant where the defendant shows he changed his position
in good faith reliance on the enrichment.52 "Agency/ministerial
receipt" applies where the defendant received the enrichment as
an agent and handed it over without notice of the plaintiff's
claim.5 3 "Bona fide purchase for value without notice" may be
raised through a third party by parties who received the claimant's
property indirectly. '  "Counter-restitution" applies if the
claimant's claim would leave the claimant unjustly enriched at the
expense of the defendant. 55 "Illegality" prevents the claimant from
relying on evidence of his own illegal acts to show that he has a
claim against the defendant. In such cases, the court may refuse to
help him. 56
If the five components of an unjust enrichment claim are
satisfied and no defense succeeds, then the claimant is entitled to a
gains-based remedy, often equated with restitution.57 Restitution
51. Dickson, supra note 10, at 107; PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF RESTITUTION 402-47 (1985).
52. BIRKS, supra note 51 at 410.
53. BURROWS ET AL., supra note 19, at 824.
54. BIRKS, supra note 51 at 439.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Id. at 424-25.
57. See e.g., id. at 417-18 for an abstract description of the way in which restitution
and unjust enrichment "quadrate"; see also Dickson, supra note 10, at 113 (This is a
common law oriented exploration of unjust enrichment, in keeping with Bank Isaiah.
Knowing the law of the Respondent country is key. Dickson explores German, French,
Italian, Dutch, English, and U.S. laws on unjust enrichment. French law introduces new
limitations to unjust enrichment claims. First, it is a last resort, since "no other
remedy.. .must be available". Secondly, unjust enrichment as a measure of damages is also
a last resort if the rules are followed to its logical conclusion. Notice that French courts
allow the plaintiff "only the lesser of the plaintiff's loss or defendant's own enrichment."
This means that given the option, a plaintiff will never opt for unjust enrichment-if another
remedy is available. Again, like the United States, an unjust enrichment claim is an
exclusive cause of action, useful where nothing else is available. In addition, the French
preclude any cases where the plaintiff benefited or was at fault.).
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may require returning property or awarding equivalent
compensation. 18
While many scholars separate unjust enrichment from
restitution, some see the two as inseparable. For example, Andrew
Kull, the reporter for the New Restatement of Restitution (U.S.),
states:
My proposition is that the law of restitution be defined
exclusively in terms of its core idea, the law of unjust
enrichment. By this definition it would be axiomatic (i) that no
liability could be asserted in restitution other than one referable
to the unjust enrichment of the defendant, and (ii) that the
measure of recovery in restitution must in every case be the
extent of the defendant's unjust enrichment. 9
Kull's argument is summed up well in the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution: "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is liable in restitution to the other."'  The comments
further note that the "law of restitution is the law of unjust
enrichment. ' 61 Even if the claimant brought a case under a
different cause of action, where a court awards restitution, there is
61an acknowledgement of and reliance upon unjust enrichment.
Prominent scholars like Peter Birks disagree, preferring to
divide the two concepts. 3 Birks distinguishes unjust enrichment
from wrongful enrichment, and claims that restitution can follow
either; therefore restitution and unjust enrichment can be
unrelated. ' In wrongful enrichment, according to Birks, there is
already a breach or wrong of some kind, and thus the remedy
58. 66 AM. JUR. 2d § 1, supra note 16 ("The word 'restitution' was used in the earlier
common law to denote the return or restoration of a specific thing or condition. In modern
legal usage, its meaning has frequently been extended to include not only the restoration
or giving back of something to its rightful owner and returning to the status quo, but also
compensation, reimbursement, indemnification, or reparation for benefits derived from,
or for loss or injury caused to, another.").
59. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (1995).
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
(Discussion Draft 2000).
61. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
62. See generally Stephen A. Smith, The Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is
Restitution a Right or a Remedy?, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1037 (2003). Smith uses the terms
"direct" and "remedial" to describe "cause of action" and unjust enrichment as a
"remedy".
63. See generally Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1767 (2001).
64. Id. at 1771-72, 1776-77.
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(restitution) is not founded on unjust enrichment. Only where
there is no "wrong" can one find unjust enrichment. ' Birks is right
on a practical level, as demonstrated in instances where the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal required that no other available cause of
action exist before allowing an unjust enrichment claim.6 Hence,
unjust enrichment only applied where no legal wrong could be
found. This threshold requirement recognizes Birks' distinction as
a functional limitation on unjust enrichment claims.
Theoretically, however, restitution is a gains-based remedy,
and to provide a gains-based remedy, the court must justify it on
grounds that the gain was inappropriate. Therefore, the better
view belongs to Kull and Stephen A. Smith, in his work, The
Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law: Is Restitution a Right or a
Remedy, which recognizes that courts may apply practical
limitations to protect the integrity of contract and other policy
interests. Thus, while for clarity of thought and in keeping with
divisions created by courts this Article explores unjust enrichment
and restitution separately, the two are nevertheless considered
indivisible. This non-distinction is particularly salient later in the
Article, as assuming interchangeability allows the transition from
remedial unjust enrichment within Chorz6w to using unjust
enrichment as a cause of action in an intellectual property case.
Having sketched unjust enrichment, its development and role in
international law is now explored.
B. Unjust Enrichment in International Law
Many consider unjust enrichment a general principle of law.
Some, like the Saluka Tribunal, see it as a general principle of
international law. Others, like Georg Schwarzenberger, fall
somewhere in between. "On the fringes of international law, the
principle [of unjust enrichment] tends already to be accepted as a
general principle of law, recognised by civilised nations." 69
65. Id. at 1783.
66. Id. at 1793.
67. See infra Part II.B.5 for a full explanation.
68. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, T 449 (Partial Award, registered with
Perm Ct. Arb. Mar. 17,2006).
69. 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 580,655 (1957).
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Most legal systems recognize unjust enrichment. 70 The Statute
of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1)(c), states that
"[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply.., the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."71 According to early Permanent Court of International
Justice ("PCIJ") judge Manley 0. Hudson and echoed by Marjorie
Whiteman, two influential international law scholars:
Article 38 of the Statute also directs to Court to apply 'the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.' As all
nations are civilized, as 'law implies civilization,' the reference
to 'civilized nations' can serve only to exclude from
consideration primitive systems of law.... It empowers the
Court to go outside the field in which States have expressed
their will to accept certain principles of law as governing their
relations inter se, and to draw upon principles common to
various systems of municipal law or generally agreed upon
among interpreters of municipal law. It authorizes use to be
made of analogies found in the national law of the various
States. 72
Under Hudson's analysis, Article 38(1)(c) permits
international courts to use unjust enrichment because it is one of
the "general principles of law recognized in civilized nations.""
This statement is not merely my derivative logic. In Whiteman's
70. See supra Part.II.A. Latin American as well as Shar'ia law countries also
recognize unjust enrichment. See Margalynne Armstrong, Reparations Litigation: What
About Unjust Enrichment?, 81 OR. L. REV. 771, 774 (2002); Sarah S. A1-Rifaee, Islamic
Banking Myths and Facts, ARAB INSIGHT, http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/190.pdf.
71. ICJ Statute, supra note 4.
72. 1 MAJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90-91 (1963) (quoting
HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-30, 610-12 (1943)).
73. See also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 173 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., Longman 9th ed. 1992) ("The meaning of that phrase [Art. 38] has
been the subject of much discussion. The intention is to authorize the Court to apply the
general principles of municipal jurisprudence, in particular private law, in so far as they
are applicable to relations of States." According to Oppenheim, "Paragraph 3 of Art. 38
nevertheless constitutes an important landmark in the history of international law
inasmuch as the States parties to the Statute did expressly recognize the existence of a 3rd
source of international law, independent of, although merely supplementary to, custom or
treaty. This was in fact the practice of international arbitration before the establishment of
the Court, in its establishment a number of international tribunals, although not bound by
the Statute, have treated x as declaratory of existing law." Oppenheim cites Lena and
others. Citing Bin Cheng at page 173, "It would seem therefore that an act is
internationally unlawful whether it violates a treaty, a rule of customary international law,
or a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.").
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Digest on International Law, she quotes Lord McNair, another
early scholar of international law:
It may be asked: What are these 'general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations'? Where are they to be found? It
is not possible to point to any code or book containing them.
Much of the content of public international law proper has been
developed by tribunals and by writers out of these general
principles, and my view is that the same source will prove
equally fruitful in the application and interpretation of those
contracts which, though not interstate contracts and therefore
not governed by public international law stricto sensu, can more
effectively be regulated by general principles of law than by
special rules of any single territorial system. They will be
developed both by contracting parties who realize the suitability
of general principles of law and by tribunals which are called
upon to adjudicate upon contracts of this type. I do not propose
to prepare a list of the rules of law likely to be recognized as
'general principles'. 'Unjust enrichment' has been referred to
above in the Lena Goldfields Award, and I shall mention only
one other likely candidate, among many, for recognition
[Respect for Acquired Rights].
1 4
The above quote supports the idea that a concept becomes
part of international law through multinational recognition
coupled with use by subsequent tribunals. Lord McNair and
Whiteman use unjust enrichment as the example of this
phenomenon. In support of Lord McNair, widespread recognition
of unjust enrichment was demonstrated above in the exploration
of domestic law; international tribunals' use of unjust enrichment
is also demonstrable. In Damages in International Law, volume 3,
Whiteman explores quasi-contractual damages. 7' In case after case,
she finds that:
International law includes within its compass a large body of
equity. Accordingly the extent to which claimants have been
allowed to recover damages in international cases on grounds of
equity apart from legal rights under existing contracts
constitutes an important phase of the subject under discussion
[damages]. There are numerous cases where damages have
74. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7272, at 93 (quoting
Lord McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, XXXIII
BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 15-16 (1957)) (internal citation omitted).
75. 3 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1732-60 (1943)
[hereinafter WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
20091
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
been allowed in situations resembling, more or less closely, an
implied or quasi-contractual relation. Various reasons are given
for the allowance of damages on such cases. At other times the
reason is stated in the familiar terms of "equity" and, at other
times, merely on the ground that international law allows
recovery in such a situation. Whatever the reason given in the
decision, the important point is that damages are allowed in
situations where it might be difficult to explain the decision on
grounds of either the wrongful breach of or interference with an
express contract." 
76
Whiteman lists dozens of international arbitrations employing
some type of unjust enrichment. " She closes with two cases, both
of which house language supporting the idea that unjust
enrichment is a general principle of international law. 78
Even given this wealth of evidence, the current status of
unjust enrichment remains unclear. This may be due both to
Cristoph Schreurer's 1974 work cautioning against using unjust
enrichment liberally and to the resulting sloppiness and
embarrassment surrounding its application. As well, although
most countries accept unjust enrichment claims, it remains an
amorphous and open-ended legal area because it lacks a universal
conception.
76. Id. at 1732.
77. See id. at 1734-61. Whiteman discusses cases that involve payment of excessive
taxes, use, or benefit enjoyed; quantum meruit; supplies furnished; services performed;
work and labor done; expenses incurred "in good faith reliance upon acts of the
respondent government"; and advances made.
78. See id. at 1760. For instance:
[T]he extinction of the contractual obligation leaves in existence, however, the
pecuniary obligations resulting from the acts performed before the extinction, as
this latter should not result in the illegal enrichment of one of the parties to the
detriment of the other; as there is no reason to presume that the Treaty intended
to set aside this fundamental principle, so much in conformity with the rules of
equity, but just the opposite, since the Treaty orders the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal to be guided by justice, equity, and good faith, and as to the application
of the rules of equity is required in particular when it comes to disputes arising
from the interpretation of contracts, we should therefore assume that it is the
duty of the Tribunal to decide whether and to what degree the defendants have
benefited by an ungrounded enrichment at the expense of the claimants.
Id. (citing Government of Turkey v. Sir W. J. Armstrong Whitworth and Co. and Vickers
Ltd., VIII Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 996, 1001, (1928)
translation).
79. See generally Christoph Schreurer, Unjustified Enrichment in International Law,
22 AM. J. COMP. L. 281 (1974).
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The tentative standing and open-ended parameters of unjust
enrichment are further complicated by its inherently moral
nature.8" Determining who deserves to be enriched is a loaded
policy decision. Judges dealing with countries and investors are
balancing very complicated economic interests, and thus prefer to
circumvent any accusations of bias. Some might argue that only in
cases where the morality is clearer than the panel's legal
legitimacy, as in Lena Goldfields," would employing unjust
enrichment behoove the tribunal.' If the act is not per se illegal,
adjudging the enrichment unjust to one party requires selecting a
deserving party. Indeed, according to Andrew Burrows, an English
unjust enrichment scholar, "in some areas the law is best explained
as responding to policy constraints on the pure principle of unjust
enrichment.""3 The tentative standing and open-ended parameters
of unjust enrichment, however, should not and have not deterred
courts from relying on unjust enrichment. If anything, these
caveats explain why courts are not always explicit about their
reliance upon unjust enrichment. Often, if another legal remedy or
cause of action is available, arbitral panels choose the more
established remedy or cause of action.' More importantly,
claimants only raise unjust enrichment as a subsidiary cause of
action, or where it offers greater benefits, as a remedy. ' Neither
motive likely elicits favorable treatment from tribunals. These
complications may explain why ICSID tribunals have not yet
explicitly relied on unjust enrichment, but are not enough to keep
international tribunals from using it.
Unjust enrichment is a useful cause of action and remedy, and
a general principle of law at the very least. The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal definition, with disgorgement potential, creates a
standard that can be applied universally. A universal standard
does two things. First, it limits abuse of unjust enrichment, both
implicit (where it is silently imported into unrelated damage
80. 66 AM. JUR. 2D § 1 ("Restitution is based not upon contract or statute, but upon
justice, morals, equity, and good conscience.").
81. The Lena Case, THE TIMES, Sept. 3, 1930, at 7.
82. This case was one of the first international arbitrations, and the legal legitimacy of
the tribunal was unclear. The tribunal was a rushed and ad hoc affair. See generally V.V.
Veeder, Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas, 47 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998).
83. BURROWS, supra note 2631, at 7.
84. See infra Part II.B.4 for a number of examples.
85. See infra Part.II.B.4.
2009]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
calculations and distorts the resulting quantum) and explicit
(cheap shots and unsubstantiated uses). Second, a universal
standard creates a well-defined and welcome space for unjust
enrichment in international investment dispute resolution.
1. Early Tribunals
From the 1890's onward, tribunals relied on unjust
enrichment. Lena Goldfields is perhaps the fountainhead of all
unjust enrichment claims in investment disputes. There, the
USSR breached a concession contract with the Lena Goldfields
mining company by creating circumstances fatal to Lena's
business. Lena claimed damages for contract breach, or
alternatively "restitution to the company of the full present value
of the company's properties, by which in the result the
Government had become 'unjustly enriched."' 87 The ad hoc
arbitral panel, having only a day to debate and faced with the
novel and politically charged task of ruling. against a country,
awarded damages for unjust enrichment.' Relying on Soviet and
Continental European law, the panel determined:
[T]he conduct of the Government was a breach of the contract
going to the root of it. In consequence Lena is entitled to be
relieved from the burden of further obligations thereunder and
to be compensated in money for the value of the benefits of
which it has been wrongfully deprived. On ordinary legal
principles this constitutes a right of action for damages, but the
Court prefers to base its award on the principle of "unjust
enrichment," although in its opinion the money result is the
89same.
Other cases also relied on remedial unjust enrichment,
including Thomas C. Baker's Case, 90 Sucrerie de Roustchouk v.
Etat hongrais, 1 The Edna, ' Spanish Zone Morocco Case, '. General
86. The Lena Case, supra note 81; see also Veeder, supra note 82.
87. The Lena Case, supra note 81, 23.
88. Id. 24. See Veeder, supra note 82.
89. The Lena Case, supra note 81, 24.
90. 4 THOMAS C. BAKER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3668 (1898).
91. Sucrerie de Rustchuk v. Etat hongrois [Rustchuk Sugar Refinery v. Hungary], 5
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 772 (1926).
92. Sudden & Christenson, Inc. v. U.S., 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 737,737 (1940) [hereinafter
The Edna].
93. Spanish Zone Morocco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Spain), 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 616
(1949).
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Finance Corporation v United Mexican States, 94 William A Parker v
United Mexican States,95 and the Landreau Arbitration. 96 The
Landreau Arbitration, for example, involved two brothers with a
concession to find guano in Peru. In keeping with the contract's
terms, they provided the Peruvian government with information
identifying guano deposits.' The United States sued on one
brother's behalf after Peru refused to make the stipulated
payments and repudiated the contract. After finding Peru's
rescission legal, the tribunal held that Peru was "bound to pay on a
quantum meruit for the discoveries which they appropriated for
their own benefit." 9
As well, in both William A. Parker v. United Mexican States
and General Finance Corporation v. United Mexican States, the
tribunals awarded restitution where contracts were considered
void. 100 In General Finance, the tribunal required Mexico to
"reimburse claimant to the extent it has been unjustly enriched"
for water concession contracts considered void for delegating
sovereign authority. "'
Additionally, the Peace Treaties following World War I
employed unjust enrichment to compensate companies whose
business contracts had been dissolved during the war. According
to Professor Schreurer, these mixed arbitral tribunals frequently
applied "restitutionary techniques based on considerations of
94. ARBITRATION SERIES 9, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2859, Gen. Fin. Corp.
546 (U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1948).
95. Parker v. United Mexican States, 4 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 36, 36-41 (1951).
96. Landreau Arbitration (U.S. v. Peru), 1 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 347, 347-67
(1948).
97. Id. at 354.
98. Id. at 358.
99. Id. at 364. See Schreuer, supra note 79, at 293-94. Interestingly, Schreurer used
this case and others to argue that unjust enrichment was primarily a remedy, and should
remain thus until a more uniform standard for unjust enrichment is set. There are two
possible responses to Schreurer. First, examining the Landreu Arbitration makes clear that
the Tribunal allowed a claim for unjust enrichment. The Tribunal's statement that the
rescission was legal means there was no illegal wrong to be remedied. Thus, in awarding a
remedy, they must have admitted a claim of unjust enrichment to justify any award
whatsoever. That is, perhaps, an inconsequential argument. More importantly, and
addressing Schreurer's valid concern about lacking "a precise range of application,"
Schreurer's argument should no longer prevent tribunals from using unjust enrichment, as
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has laid the groundwork for this "precise range." Indeed,
the inconsistency ICSID cases show is unjustified given the precedent set by the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, and the relative ease that tribunal experienced in applying them.
100. See Schreuer, supra note 79, at 295-96.
101. ARBITRATION SERIES 9, supra note 94 546,548.
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unjust enrichment" 102 where uncompleted business dealings had
lost their contractual basis.
Chorz6w Factory " may be both the most famous and most
unrecognized example of this. ICSID tribunals rely heavily on
Chorz6w as precedent for remedies. 104 Thus, showing that experts
in Chorz6w would have explored unjust enrichment if Poland and
Germany had not settled, would contribute significantly to
establishing unjust enrichment as a general principle of
international law. Below, this Article attempts to do exactly that,
arguing that Chorz6w endorses unjust enrichment. This reading
challenges conventional interpretations of Chorz6w as solely
endorsing expectation damages.
2. The Chorz6w Factory Case
The German government sued Poland for expropriating a
private German investor's factory after World War I. 05 Poland was
allowed to seize German state companies in its territory, but was
not permitted to occupy private interests. The German
government had sold the Chorz6w factory to a private company at
a deep discount before its seizure in 1922. 1"0 Poland operated and
developed the Chorz6w factory from the time of seizure until 1928,
the date of the award. ,07
Germany won the case.' 0 The PCIJ found that since the
seizure did not comply with treaty regulations, it was not a legal
expropriation, but rather an illegal seizure. 10 The Geneva
Convention prescribed restitution as the remedy for
expropriation. 10 Using restitution as its baseline, the Chorz6w
Tribunal laid out a menu of award calculations. The case settled,
so the expert never chose the best calculation method. Before
102. Schreuer, supra note 79, at 291. See also WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 75.
103. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
104. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award) 484 ("The customary international law
standard for the assessment of damages resulting from an unlawful act is set out in the
decision of the PCIJ in the Chorz6w Factory case .... ).
105. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 5.
106. Id at 20-21.
107. See generally id. at 5-24.
108. Id. at 63-64.
109. Id. at 46 (Part III).
110. Factory at Chorzow, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 23.
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settlement, however, the tribunal presented the following
questions to the expert:
I.-A. What was the value, on July 3rd, 1922, expressed in
Reichsmarks current at the present time, of the undertaking for
the manufacture of nitrate products of which the factory was
situated at Chorz6w in Polish Upper Silesia, in the state in
which that undertaking (including the lands, buildings,
equipment, stocks and processes at its disposal, supply and
delivery contracts, goodwill and future prospects) was, on the
date indicated, in the hands of the Bayerische and
Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke?
B. What would have been the financial results, expressed in
Reichsmarks current at the present time (profits or losses),
which would probably have been given by the undertaking thus
constituted from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of the present
judgment, if it had been in the hands of the said Companies?
II.-What would be the value at the date of the present
judgment, expressed in Reichsmarks current at the present
time, of the same undertaking (Chorz6w) if that undertaking
(including lands, buildings, equipment, stocks, available
processes, supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future
prospects) had remained in the hands of the Bayerische and
Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, and had either remained
substantially as it was in 1922 or had been developed
proportionately on lines similar to those applied in the case of
other undertakings of the same kind, controlled by the
Bayerische, for instance, the undertaking of which the factory is
situated at Piesteritz? .
Question I invites one key inquiry. While the tribunal clearly
awards restitution for the value of the company at the time of
taking, what exactly are they offering post-1922? The question,
"[w]hat would [have been] the financial results.., which would
probably have been given by the undertaking thus constituted
from ... 1922 to... the present judgment, if it [the factory] had
been in the hands of the said Companies?" welcomes two
interpretations.
Under the first interpretation, Part B of the award is based on
hypothetical profits/losses. 12 If so, what constitutes the basis for
111. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. supra note 1, at 51-52.
112. Id. ("What would have been the financial results, expressed in Reichsmarks
current at the present time (profits or losses), which would probably have been given by
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these profits/losses? In Question 11 the tribunal mentioned using
data from a similar company to approximate Chorz6w's
profits/losses. 13 But analogous company data is mentioned
explicitly in reference to calculating damages for Question II,
current fair market value. "'
The second way to read the question is to assume that the
tribunal, when referring to "in the hands of the said Companies,"
was speaking about "the Companies" [Chorz6w] as beneficiaries of
the profits/losses. '5 The tribunal then was asking that the expert
examine the books from Chorz6w during the years Poland ran it,
and use those real profits and losses to determine what should be
awarded the deprived Companies.
The tribunal further muddled this point by subsequently
supporting both hypotheses.
The purpose of question I is to determine the monetary value,
both of the object[s] which should have been restored in kind
and of the additional damage, on the basis of the estimated
value of the undertaking including stocks at the moment of
taking possession by the Polish Government, together with any
probable profit that would have accrued to the undertaking
between the date of taking possession and that of the expert
opinion. 116
The above statement, with its use of "probable profit" supports the
first interpretation. And yet, a later statement seems to support
the second interpretation.
As regards the lucrum cessans, in relation to question II, it may
be remarked that the cost of upkeep of the corporeal objects
forming part of the undertaking and even the cost of
improvement and normal development of the installation and
of the industrial property incorporated therein, are bound to
absorb in a large measure the profits, real or supposed, of the
the undertaking thus constifuted from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of the present judgment,
if it had been in the bands of the said Companies?").
113. Id. ("What would be the value . . . had [it] been developed proportionately on
lines similar to those applied in the case of other undertakings of the same kind, controlled
by the Bayerische, for instance, the undertaking of which the factory is situated at
Piesteritz?").
114. Id.
115. Id. ("What would have been the financial results, expressed in Reichsmarks
current at the present time (profits or losses), which would probably have been given by
the undertaking thus constituted from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of the present judgment,
if it had been in the hands of the said Companies?").
116. Id. at 52.
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undertaking. Up to a certain point, therefore, any profit may be
left out of account, for it will be included in the real or supposed
value of the undertaking at the present moment. If, however, the
reply given by the experts to question I B should show that after
making good the deficits for the years during which the factory
was working at a loss, and after due provision for the cost of
upkeep and normal improvement during the following years,
there remains a margin of profit, the amount of such profit
should be added to the compensation to be awarded. 117
Only the actual Chorz6w factory operations could yield "real"
profits. Recall that Question I.B addressed profits between 1922
and the present. If the tribunal was asking the expert to calculate
profits and losses based on the "years during which the factory was
working at loss" and "real" profits are to be taken into account, "8
then Question I must be relying on Chorz6w's financial
information while under the Polish government.
If the tribunal was awarding the value of the property at
taking, plus any real profits the Polish government made from the
factory during the years it controlled the factory, then the tribunal
was effectively awarding the amount by which Poland was
enriched, or in other words, unjust enrichment. Whereas
hypothetical lost profits are damages based on what the claimant
could have earned; relying on the current value of the factory or
awarding the amount that the Polish government was actually
enriched was a gains-based calculation.
Interestingly, the mention of using "real" profits to calculate
"lucrums cessans" (lost profits) in Question II "' also introduces a
gains-based remedy to Question II. Calculating the fair market
value ("FMV") including the future flow of profits, involves
evaluating the value at taking and then projecting a growth rate
comparable to that of a like company and estimating the resulting
potential profits. This calculation leaves no space for real profits.
Hence, repeated referrals to real profits when presenting Question
II mean that the tribunal also wanted to assess the current value of
the factory in determining the remedy. Having both the
hypothetical future value and the current value of Chorz6w
allowed the tribunal additional remedy options. As awarding the
claimant the current value of the factory is a gains-based recovery
117. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 51.
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(the claimant walks away with the value-added by the respondent),
the tribunal clearly intended to include the unjust enrichment
award option.
Other language in the Chorz6w opinion suggests that the
tribunal requested an unjust enrichment calculation. The tribunal's
decision to include the value of the chemical factory in the value of
Chorz6w, even though the factory was not built and was
unapproved at the time of the seizure, is one such example:
It must be stated that the Chorz6w factory to be valued by the
experts includes also the chemical factory.
Besides the arguments which, in the Polish Government's
opinion, tend to show that the working of the said factory was
not established on a profitable basis-arguments which it will
be for the experts to consider-that Government has claimed
that the working depended on a special authorization, which the
Polish authorities were entitled to refuse. But the Court is of
opinion that this argument is not well-founded. 120
The tribunal based its opinion that the argument was "not well-
founded" on the German company's plans, and on the fact that
chemical factories are normal in that type of business. 121 It is worth
noting, however, that the German companies are getting the
benefit of the Polish government's work and expansion.
In addition, the Chorz6w Tribunal, perhaps from necessity,
used restitution as a starting point, both morally and substantively:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act-a principle which seems to be established by
international practice and in particular by the decisions of
arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of
damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by
restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are the
principles which should serve to determine the amount of
compensation due for an act contrary to international law. 122
120. Id. at 54.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 47.
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In short, restitution underlies the decision in Chorz6w. The
tribunal introduced damages to augment restitution, and gave the
expert a range of options for calculating the additional damages.
"[T]he Court considers it preferable to endeavour to ascertain the
value to be estimated by several methods, in order to permit [sic] a
comparison and if necessary of [sic] completing the results of the
one by those of the others." " One method the tribunal proposed "
is what we today would deem expectation damage calculations-
calculating FMV with future flow of profits by finding the value of
the company at taking and then projecting a rate of growth
comparable to a like company. " Another method was restitution
plus hypothetical lost profits up until the award. 126 In yet another
alternative, the expert could have based the award on the
disgorgement of the current real value of the factory, which would
be unjust enrichment, as it would be based on what the Polish state
owned at the time (including future value). 127 Lastly, the award
might be based on another unjust enrichment calculation, restoring
the value of the factory upon seizure plus disgorgement of any real
profits the Polish state accrued while it possessed the factory. 12
ICSID tribunals, citing Chorz6w, overwhelmingly focus on
the fair market value option, using the phrase "reparation must, as
far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed" 2 9 to justify their
damage award. The International Law Commission ("ILC")
Articles now codify this standard. 130
123. Id. at 53.
124. d. at 51-52.
125. See JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 85-86 (8th ed.
2003). See also Discounted Cash Flow Valuation, http://moneyterms.co.uk/dcf/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter DCF] (illustrating how expectation damage calculations
manifest in valuing companies); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/12 (U.S.-Arg. 2006) (Award) available at http://icsid.worldbank.org (for
examples of companies proposing discounted case flow evaluations to calculate
expectation damages).
126. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 51-52.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 47.
130. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Sup. no. 10 at 91, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter Draft
Articles]. In accordance with the PCIJ:
[R]eparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible,
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Some tribunals, however, have combined the Chorz6w award
possibilities. ' The general trend of giving judicial leeway on
award calculations may support these creative combinations.
These cases, including Azurix Corp. v. Argentina32 and LG&E
Corp. v. Argentina, 133 cite SD Myers, Inc. v. Canada. 134 According
to Azurix:
[T]he lack of a measure of compensation in NAFTA for
breaches other than a finding of expropriation reflected the
intention of the parties to leave it open to the tribunals to
determine it in light of the circumstances of the case taking into
account the principles of both international law and the
provisions of NAFfA. 3 5
Older cases, while more restrained, did blend Chorz6w
remedy options, at least in dicta. For example, the resubmitted
Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia "6 Tribunal invoked Chorz6w .7 and
then, in dicta, blended unjust enrichment and damages-using one
party's enrichment to approximate the other's sustained damage:
If the purpose of compensation is to put Amco in the position it
would have been in had it received the benefits of the Profit-
Sharing Agreement, then there is no reason of logic that
requires that to be done by reference only to data that would
have been known to a prudent businessman in 1980. It may, on
one view, be the case that in a lawful taking, Amco would have
been entitled to the fair market value of the contract at the
moment of dispossession. In making such a valuation, a
Tribunal in 1990 would necessarily exclude factors subsequent
to 1980. But if Amco is to be placed as if the contract had
remained in effect, then subsequent known factors bearing on
that performance are to be reflected in the valuation
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would
bear ....
131. See Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 422; LG&E Capital Corp.
v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1 (U.S.-Arg. 2004) (Decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
(follow "cases"; then follow "search cases"; then follow ARB/02/1 hyperlink; then follow
"Decisions & Awards"; then follow "English (Original)" hyperlink under "Decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (April 30, 2004)").
132. Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12.
133. LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1.
134. S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA Arbitration, (2000) (Partial Award).
135. Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 422.
136. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/1 (U.S.-
Indon. 1990) (Resubmitted Case: Award).
137. Id. 184.
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technique. 38
The above blending, read in conjunction with the following
statement, creates a situation wherein the respondent is
responsible for the downside risk of lost value due to
expropriation and for the upside possibility of increasing the value
of the investment. "The only subsequent known factors relevant to
value which are not to be relied on are those attributable to the
illegality itself." ... Read closely, if the value of the taking drops
because of respondent, the drop will be excluded. If, however, the
respondent increased the property value, this can be included since
it is known data. The successful claimant would get the greater of
the actual value (through restitution approximation) or the
hypothetical value if the actual investment underperformed.
Then, in ADC v. Hungary, 140 the tribunal used Chorz6w to
justify an award that is clearly remedial unjust enrichment.
3. ADC v. Hungary
ADC had a concession to build a new terminal in the
Budapest airport. '' The contract included the right to operate the
entrepreneurial shops at the terminal, handle the baggage, and
train and manage employees. ' The management-training
agreement provided that the Hungarian government would pay
ADC a fixed fee each year for training airport personnel and
management.'43 After ADC completed the new terminal, the
Hungarian government passed a law preventing ADC from
operating the terminal-effectively edging them out. '" A few years
later, after the airport became a major international hub, ' the
Hungarian government sold the airport to a British company
(BAA) for $1.2 billion dollars. ADC brought a claim for
expropriation under ICSID.',6
138. Id. 1 186. However, the award that Amco received is consistent only with a
damages remedy. This is not a condemnation of the award itself, but rather to highlight an
ambiguity introduced through the exploration.
139. Id. 186.
140. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award) 484.
141. Id. 106.
142. Id. $T 146-149, 167.
143. Id. IT 146-147.
144. Id. IT 172-192.
145. See id. I 193-195.
146. Id. 1 207,210.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 31:501
The Tribunal found for ADC. Since the BIT requirements for
a "legal" expropriation weren't met, the tribunal decided that the
BIT-prescribed expropriation remedy, restitution of the value of
the property at taking, did not apply. 147 Instead, the Tribunal
decided to use what it deemed the Chorz6w customary
international law standard for "illegal" expropriation. 14" Relying
on Chorz6w, the ADC Tribunal awarded restitution of the value
of the property at the time of the award, rather than at the time of
expropriation. ,' This reflects one of the options granted in
Chorz6w Question II, explored above. Thus, the tribunal awarded
the claimant's portion of the increased value of the terminal. This
is not the hypothetical value of what claimant would have earned,
nor in any way approximates claimant's loss. Rather, the award
was based on disgorgement of what Hungary gained unjustly from
claimant's investment.
In dicta, the Tribunal focused on Hungary's gain from ADC's
know-how (i.e. the management contract). 10 For example, "[t]he
management fee of 3% payable in each calendar year commencing
on and after the Operations Commencement Date... was
designed in large part to compensate the claimants for the services
147. See id. [ 475-476. The BIT provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or
indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments unless
the following conditions are complied with: (a) The measures are taken in the
public interest and under due process of law; (b) The measures are not
discriminatory; (c) The measures are accompanied by provision for the payment
of just compensation. 2. The amount of compensation must correspond to the
market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of the
expropriation. 3. The amount of this compensation may be estimated according
to the laws and regulations of the country where the expropriation is made. 4.
The compensation must be paid without undue delay upon completion of the
legal expropriation procedure, but not later than three months upon completion
of this procedure and shall be transferred in the currency in which the
investment is made. In the event of delays beyond the three-months' period, the
Contracting Party concerned shall be liable to the payment of interest based on
prevailing rates.
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Government of
the Hungarian People's Republic on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Cyprus-Hung., art. 4, May 24, 1989, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/diteiia/docs/bits/hungary-cyprus.pdf [hereinafter Cyprus
Agreement] (emphasis added). There is a query whether the standard implies that all
expropriations that come to court are inherently illegal, as, if the criteria were met, the
claimant would already have received the fair market value of their expropriation.
148. See ADC Affiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16.
149. See id. 520.
150. See id. 148-149.
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that had been rendered by the Terminal Manager... before the
Operations Commencement Date.' ' . In addition, after the
Operations Commencement Date, ADC management provided
"on-going supervision and knowledge transfer." 152 The
management contract paid a fixed annual rate. Therefore, higher
passenger volume would not have increased the amount claimant
received. Indeed, the management contract was the piece that least
supported an award of the respondent's disgorgement of profits,
unless the award was intended to reflect the benefit Hungary
received from "know-how." These fees, however, were awarded
independently of (and on top of) the restitution award. Other
operational elements, were given a fixed percentage-so here
again, the tribunal may have awarded a remedy exceeding the
value of claimant's possible loss. "' This is not to say the tribunal
was wrong, just that as a damages remedy the result is untenable.
The tribunal discussed Chorz6w and its applications at length.
First, the tribunal recognized Chorz6w's primacy: "The customary
international law standard for the assessment of damages resulting
from an unlawful act is set out in the decision of the PCIJ in the
Chorz6w Factory case."" The Tribunal continued, quoting
Chorz6w, "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed." 155 After using Chorz6w to justify awarding a remedy
other than the BIT mandated one, the Tribunal stated:
151. Id. 148.
152. Id. 149.
153. See id. 509 ("The Respondent further criticises the IRR used by LECG.
Schedule C to the Agreement establishes a target IRR of 15.4% with an upper limit of
17.5%. In the Tribunal's view, LECG was justified in using the upper limit. As it is shown
by the Claimants and it is borne out by the events subsequent to the expropriation, the
Budapest Airport is indeed one of the fastest growing airports in the world. That increase
in traffic would certainly have caused an IRR superior to the contractual cap of 17.5%.
Furthermore, the fact that the 2002 Business Plan forecast substantially increased
projected dividends in 2010 and 2011 is due to the fact that the Project Loan was
scheduled to be repaid by the beginning of 2009, thereby decreasing the costs of the
Project Company and increasing the revenues that were available for distribution as
dividend in 2010 and 2011."). Note that the contract may have included a clause with "two
alternative responses to better-than-expected Project Company performance (i.e., tariff
adjustment and dividend waiver)," which refutes my statement, but does not challenge the
idea that unjust enrichment is the underlying justification for the Tribunal's award. See id
508.
154. Id. 484.
155. Id. (quoting Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
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[T]he PCIJ considered that the principles to determine the
amount of compensation for an act contrary to international
law are:
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would
bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained
which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment
in place of it. 156
The tribunal continued with an exploration of the current role
of Chorz6w in international investment disputes. 1' In its
discussion, the tribunal listed a wide range of ICSID cases,158
Oppenheim's International Law, '59 the ILC draft articles, " and
recent ICJ cases, 61  all of which cite Chorz6w as accepted
customary international law. After its arsenal of evidence, the
tribunal decided that "[t]he remaining issue is what consequence
does application of this customary international law standard have
for the present case. It is clear that actual restitution cannot take
place." 162 Thus, "it is, in the* words of the Chorz6w Factory
decision, 'payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear', which is the matter to be
decided." 163 The Tribunal explained:
The present case is almost unique among decided cases
concerning the expropriation by States of foreign owned
156. Id. 485 (quoting Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 47)
(emphasis omitted).
157. See id. Il 487-493.
158. E.g., S.D. Myers, Inc.$ 311 (2000) (Partial Award); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,
ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 122 (Aug., 2000); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8 400 (May 2005); Petrobart
Limited v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(Energy Charter Treaty), Arbitration No. 126/2003 77-8 (Mar. 2005); Amoco International
Finance Corp. v. Iran, 15 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 189, 246 (May 2004); MTD Equity Sdn Bhd
and MTD Chile SA v. Chile, ICSID. Case No. ARB/01/7 238 (May 2004).
159. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73.
160. Draft Articles, supra note 130.
161. E.g., the case concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hung. v. Slovakia,
1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25); the LaGrand Case, Germany v. U.S., 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); the
case concerning the arrest warrant of April 11, 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 1 76 (Feb. 14); the case concerning Avena and other Mexican
Nationals, Mexico v. U.S., 2004 I.C.J. 12, 1$ 119-121 (Mar. 31); Advisory Opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
162. ADC Affiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16 1 495.
163. Id.
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property, since the value of the investment after the date of
expropriation (1 January 2002) has risen very considerably
while other arbitrations that apply the Chorz6w Factory
standard all invariably involve scenarios where there has been a
decline in the value of the investment after regulatory
interference. It is for this reason that application of the
restitution standard by various arbitration tribunals has led to
use of the date of the expropriation as the date for the valuation
of damages.
However, in the present, sui generis, type of case the application
of the Chorz6w Factory standard requires that the date of
valuation should be the date of the Award and not the date of
expropriation, since this is what is necessary to put the
Claimants in the same position as if the expropriation had not
been committed. 164
Here, in response to an actual increase in value under
Hungary, the tribunal did not award restitution of the value of the
property at the time of expropriation. 16 Rather, the tribunal
awardedthe claimant the current value of the property-reflecting
developments within Hungary and by the Hungarian
government-by awarding restitution at the date of the award. 16
The amount awarded then is the amount that Hungary gained
through possession-or disgorgement of respondent's unjust
enrichment. The unspoken theoretical basis of the Tribunal's
award became more apparent with the example it chose to support
its remedy:
This kind of approach is not without support. The PCIJ in the
Chorz6w Factory case stated that damages are not necessarily
limited to the value of the undertaking at the moment of
dispossession.... It is noteworthy that the European Court of
Human Rights has applied Chorz6w Factory in circumstances
comparable to the instant case to compensate the expropriated
party the higher value the property enjoyed at the moment of
the Court's judgment rather than the considerably lesser value
it had had at the earlier date of dispossession. 
167
The statement emphasized is both the crux of the ADC award and
definitively an unjust enrichment award. Indeed, invoking
164. Id. $ 496-497.
165. Id. 1 497.
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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enjoyment by the respondent signals a gains-based evaluation and
justification.
Also interesting, the case that the ADC Tribunal relied on to
support their interpretation of Chorz6w, Papamichalopoulos v.
Greece, clearly employs unjust enrichment. 16 Papamichalopoulos,
however, is an ICJ takings decision, and therefore might not be
considered persuasive for ICSID cases.
The ADC Tribunal also noted the Papamichalopoulos
Tribunal's reliance on* Chorz6w's standard for illegality."' As a
consequence of illegality, "international case law, of courts or
arbitration tribunals, affords the Court a precious source of
inspiration.... In particular, the Permanent Court of International
Justice held as follows in its judgment of 13 September 1928 in the
case concerning the factory at Chorz6w .... , 70
The above train of thought leads one to believe that Chorz6w
has created a standard for awarding unjust enrichment for illegal
takings if the value of the property at issue increased significantly.
The language of damages here is attached to a remedy that in no
way approximates the loss to the claimant, but rather assumes that
the respondent's gain suffices as a proxy. While the monetary
result is merited in situations where the tribunal cannot assess
actual loss, the language justifying the result should be that of
unjust enrichment rather than damages, to avoid conflating ideas.
The ADC Tribunal concluded:
[Ilt must assess the compensation to be paid by the Respondent
to the Claimants in accordance with the Chorz6w Factory
standard, i.e., the Claimants should be compensated the market
value of the expropriated investments as at the date of this
168. See Papamichalopoulos, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. $1 36-45. In the ADC Tribunal's
words:
[T]he Court ordered restitution of the land, including all of the buildings and
other improvements made over the intervening years by the Greek Navy, and
further (para. 39), that if restitution would not be made:
[T]he Court holds that [Greece] is to pay the applicants, for damage and
loss of enjoyment since the authorities took possession of the land in 1967,
the current value of the land, increased by the appreciation brought about
by the existence of the buildings and the construction costs of the latter.
ADC Affiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16 497 (quoting Papamichalopoulos, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
39). Restitution would be the value of the land at the time of expropriation. Restitution
of the current value is no longer restitution based on a claim of damages, but is now a gains-
based award restoring Respondent's ill-gotten gains.
169. ADC Affiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16,$ 497.
170. Papamichalopoulos, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep., J 36.
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Award, which the Tribunal takes as of September 30, 2006. '7'
The Tribunal's rather novel interpretation of the Chorz6w Factory
standard is not incorrect. It simply relies on a relatively
unexploited option in the Chorz6w remedy menu. What is novel is
the introduction of the Chorz6w unjust enrichment option into the
ICSID tool kit.
The ADC Tribunal's silence regarding its reliance on unjust
enrichment remains problematic. As shown, the remedy was
unjust enrichment. The tribunal's belief that Hungary did not
deserve to be enriched at ADC's expense also influenced the
remedy. The tribunal, however, outright rejected unjust
enrichment. "Consequently, the Tribunal rejects the claimants'
claim for damages under the unjust enrichment approach, which,
in the Tribunal's opinion, has not been substantiated by the
claimants with either sufficient facts or law."172 An exploration of
the discounted cash flow calculation method '73 and other related
calculation details directly preceded the Tribunal's rejection of
unjust enrichment. There was no segue. In fact, one wonders how
the tribunal happened upon this statement. Awarding restitution
of the value of the property, including Hungary's added value,
would seem to discourage casually discarding unjust enrichment.
As well, when relying on restitution, a remedy based on unjust
enrichment, the tribunal might spend some time differentiating the
two. They are not the same, but are similar enough that casual
disregard is problematic, especially when reading between the
lines of the decision demonstrates the tribunal's reliance on unjust
enrichment.
In the tribunal's defense, the claimant's calculations
inexplicably resulted in markedly different amounts under the
unjust enrichment approach and the restitution approach. 174
Restitution is the remedy for an unjust enrichment claim, so the
$23 million difference was mysterious.175 But the claimant's
calculations may explain why the tribunal rejected the "unjust
enrichment" calculation method. "  Rejecting the elevated
171. ADCAffiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16, 499.
172. Id. 500.
173. See DCF, supra note 125.
174. ADC Affiliate, Case No. ARB/03/16, 243.
175. Id. Damages under the Restitution approach equal $76 million and damages
under the Unjust Enrichment approach equal $99 million.
176. Id. T 500.
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calculation measure, however, only served to further complicate
the issue by creating a false dichotomy between restitution and
unjust enrichment. Tribunals' silence regarding unjust enrichment
makes awards like that of ADC awkward-as it used damage
calculation measures and language for an award that was gains-
based. One unexpected negative outcome is that mixing and
matching gains-based awards with damages can lead to duplicative
awards and windfalls. If a tribunal awards the claimant the gains
accrued by the respondent, the claimant cannot then get the
damages they suffered, as those damages would most likely be
subsumed within the outlay costs necessary for the actual gains. "'
Chorz6w and ADC are not alone in relying on unjust
enrichment. As Whiteman demonstrates in her treatise, older
cases frequently relied on unjust enrichment. 178 Later ICSID cases
have done so to a lesser degree, often in a manner that resembles
ADC's unmeasured treatment. 179
4. Unjust Enrichment in ICSID
ICSID tribunals have touched briefly on issues of unjust
enrichment. Both lawyers and tribunals have used unjust
enrichment frivolously, thereby weakening the concept. For
example, in Repsol v. Ecuador,8" the respondent used unjust
177. The Tribunal may have awarded a partially duplicative remedy, given that they
awarded both the current value of the Claimant's interests (including the assets' future
value) and unpaid dividends for the time between the expropriation and the award. The
award would only be duplicative, however, if Hungary used the money from the unpaid
dividends to invest in increasing the Terminal's profitability. Simply awarding "the
estimated value of the Claimant's stake in the Project company as of the Award date"
would allow the Company to get the profits Hungary earned (without any input costs from
the Company), while avoiding the possibility of a duplicative award, as one might assume
a good chunk of the payments received from dividends would have been reinvested to
achieve the sort of growth the airport realized under Hungary. See id. 518.
178. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 75, at 1732-60.
179. See e.g, Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecudaor
(Petroecudor), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/10 (2007) (Decision on the
Application for Annulment); Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8
(2007) (Award) (Germany/Argentina BIT); Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/12 (U.S.-Arg. 2006) (Award), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org;
Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 (U.S.-Arg. 2004)
(Decisions on Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org; Enron Corp. v.
Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 (U.S.-Arg. 2007) (Award); American
Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Rep. of Zaire, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/93/1
(1997); LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1.
180. Repsol, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/01/10 (2007) (Decision on the Application
for Annulment).
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enrichment to shame the tribunal. The "Committee was morally
obligated to avoid any illegal and unjust enrichment." ... In Siemens
v. Argentina, Argentina used the concept to contest compound
interest saying, "this element of the Claim amounts to an attempt
by the claimant to unjustly enrich itself in the circumstances of this
case." ' As well, unjust enrichment arose as a cause of action in a"
few cases where claimants tossed everything possible at the
respondents. 183 In these cases, arbitral panels were able to avoid
employing unjust enrichment by relying on other, more traditional
causes of action. Alternatively, in Enron and Azurix, claimants
invoked unjust enrichment as a remedial measure with no
reference to respondent's enrichment. Then in CMS, '5 LG&E, '8
AME v. Zaire,'87 Southern Pacific Properties, " and others,
respondents invoked the possibility of the award unjustly enriching
the claimant as a defense to reduce damages. In addition, cases
like Inceysa v. Ecuador employed unjust enrichment as a
successful jurisdictional defense. 189 Lastly, in Santa Helena, the
181. Id. 23 (This appeal had no impact, as the annulment committee sustained the
award.).
182. Siemens, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8 $ 125.
183. See, e.g., Amco, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/1; Saluka Investments BV v.
Czech Republic (Partial Award, registered with Perm Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
184. See Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 9 422; Enron, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 349, 383-449 (Enron suggested the unjust enrichment of
Argentina as one measure of compensation. According to Enron, the unjust enrichment
approach results in amounts for December 31, 2001, ranging from U.S. $579,475,694 to
U.S. $582,018,216, depending on whether a "purchase price" or a "wealth transfer" variant
is adopted. The Tribunal probably dismissed this claim because the claimant made no
good argument for the increased award value under unjust enrichment.).
185. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/8 (May 2005).
186. See LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1. See also Enron, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 9 238 (wherein Respondent, Argentina makes a very similar
claim.). In LG&E, Respondent Argentina accuses Claimant, LG&E, of attempting to
unjustly enrich itself. "They are not only trying to use the Bilateral Treaty as an insurance
policy against the general economic crisis, but also desire to enrich themselves
illegitimately in such a context." LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1 at 91108.
The Tribunal here was sympathetic, forgiving Argentina for some of the loss on "state of
necessity" grounds. Id. at $ 33-53, 59-62, 90-98.
187. See American Manufacturing & Trading, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/93/1.
188. See Southern Pacific Properties v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/84/3
(1992) (The Tribunal uses unjust enrichment as a mitigating factor that "should be taken
into account in the event that any compensation is awarded in this case.").
189. In Inceysa v. El Salvador, El Salvador used local courts to get out of a contract.
The other party, Inceysa, sued under ICSID for enforcement or compensation. The
Tribunal denied jurisdiction on grounds of unjust enrichment to Claimant if the contract
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tribunal used unjust enrichment in dicta to support compound
interest. '90
This list does not even begin to address the more subtle case-
specific differences. Nor does the list highlight the lack of evidence
and argument presented in these cases. As well, the list does not
do justice to the off-handed dismissals (sometimes warranted,
sometimes not), the implicit reliance, and the misuse of the
concept by both tribunals and lawyers. Indeed, the indiscriminate
and unclear use of unjust enrichment by all parties undermines the
integrity of what could be a useful and fair tool in international
arbitration.
Some ICSID tribunals, however, have explored unjust
enrichment in a productive manner. In these disputes, discussed
below, the lawyers often failed to make a strong case. Still, these
cases merit examination, as they may guide future applications of
unjust enrichment. As well, they demonstrate that even though
there has been some disappointing treatment of unjust enrichment,
it has not been written off entirely. In addition, it is of interest that
ICSID tribunals nearly always use the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
definition of unjust enrichment. This means that although the
tribunals and lawyers have been all over the map, there is some
consensus as to the correct application of unjust enrichment.
i. Saluka (Cause of Action)
Saluka v. The Czech Republic91 represents one of the few
instances where a claimant (Saluka) in a recent investor-State
was performed. Claimant, Inceysa, defrauded El Salvador to obtain the contract, and thus
any enrichment was unjust. Specifically, the Tribunal found:
The acts committed by Inceysa during the bidding process are in violation of the
legal principle that prohibits unlawful enrichment.
The written legal systems of the nations governed by the Civil Law system
recognize that, when the cause of the increase in the assets of a certain person is
illegal, such enrichment must be sanctioned by preventing its consummation.
Applying the principle discussed above to the case at hand, we note that Inceysa
resorted to fraud to obtain a benefit that it would not have otherwise obtained.
Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Rep. of El Salvador, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/26
(2006) 253-255.
190. See Santa Elena S.A. v. Rep. of Costa Rica, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/96/1 101 (2000) (The tribunal used unjust enrichment in dicta to justify awarding
compound interest. In discussing appropriate damages the Santa Elena Tribunal stated,
"the taking state is not entitled unjustly to enrich itself by reason of the fact that the
payment of compensation has been long delayed.").
191. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic (Partial Award, registered with Perm
Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
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dispute employed unjust enrichment as a cause of action (albeit
subsidiary) under a bilateral investment treaty. In Saluka, CSOB
and IPB were State-owned banks that the Czech Republic was
attempting to privatize."'9 Saluka was a minority shareholder in
IPB. " The Czech Republic, through the Czech National Bank,
forced a transfer of IPB to CSOB. 194 Saluka contended that the
Czech Republic violated BIT Article 3's "fair and equitable
treatment" clause by "fail[ing] to prevent the unjust enrichment of
CSOB at the expense of the IPB shareholders, including Saluka,
upon the transfer of IPB's business to CSOB and the
aforementioned State aid following the forced administration." 19'
The Tribunal rejected Saluka's argument, stating first that
"[t]he concept of unjust enrichment is recognized as a general
principle of international law."1" The Tribunal then applied
international law, quoting the unjust enrichment tenets from the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to frame the discussion. 197
Proceeding, the tribunal highlighted a key ambiguity, whose
interpretation will dictate the future of unjust enrichment claims
under BITs. The question, which the Tribunal put forth but did not
answer, was: "If it is assumed that the 'fair and equitable
treatment' standard also includes the general principle of unjust
enrichment, [then] an investor would therefore also. be protected
by this standard against unjust enrichment by the host State." 198
The Tribunal left its own threshold question unanswered,
instead invalidating the claim on the grounds that "there was no
enrichment of the Respondent to the detriment of the
Claimant." " Specifically:
In the case before the Tribunal, the question would be whether
the Czech State has, by means of the transfer of IPB's business
to CSOB and the provision of the aforementioned State aid
following the forced administration, taken or received anything
of value at the expense of Saluka. For the reasons set out below,
the Tribunal would answer this question in the negative. 20
192. Id. IT 75, 77.
193. Id. 121.
194. Id. IT 142-43.
195. Id. 310.
196. Id. 1 449.
197. Id.
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The Tribunal began by maintaining that actions that enrich a
company cannot be considered to enrich a shareholder. 21
Following, the tribunal drew a conclusion that may dissuade
investors from making unjust enrichment claims:
[I]t was IPB's and not the Claimant's banking business that was
transferred to CSOB. IPB's assets were owned by IPB itself, not
by its shareholders. Again, the concept of the separateness of
the company from its shareholders prevents the Tribunal from
equating IPB and Saluka. Consequently, CSOB did not receive
anything at the expense of Saluka.
This was a particularly odd argument given that in cases like
Enron v. Argentina, shareholders were awarded damages for
expropriation owing to lost share value. 203
Subsequently, the Tribunal rejected Saluka's argument that
"for the Czech Republic to become liable towards Saluka it is
sufficient to establish that the Czech Republic actively participated
in a conspiracy to enrich one private party at the expense of
another by using regulatory powers to effect an illegal transfer of
ownership in IPB's business."" Finding the argument "legally not
well founded, 20 5 the tribunal explained that "[i]t stretches the
principle of unjust enrichment beyond its proper scope."'  In
delimiting the scope of unjust enrichment the tribunal stated, "The
notion of one party being an accessory to an unjustified transfer
between two other parties is not part of the concept of unjust
enrichment." 207
This was a valid interpretation of unjust enrichment
parameters, as the State must be enriched at the expense of the
claimant. The Tribunal did not, however, adequately distinguish
expropriation from unjust enrichment. Although there is
substantial overlap between unjust enrichment and expropriation,
as explored below, the lack of necessity for one party to be an
accessory to an unjustified transfer between two other parties is
one of a few key differences that make investors prefer
201. Id. 452.
202. Id. 453.
203. See Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 349, 383-
449 (U.S.-Arg. 2007) (Award).
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expropriation to unjust enrichment when choosing causes of action
(the others being a better assortment of damages and a set of
specific rules outlining expropriation).
The sources that the Saluka Tribunal cited are also of interest.
Consistent with almost all tribunals following its publication, the
Saluka Tribunal cited Schreurer's Unjustified Enrichment in
International Law as evidence that unjust enrichment is a general
principle of international law. " The Tribunal also referenced the
Lena Goldfields litigation. " Also, in defining unjust enrichment,
the Tribunal relied on Benjamin Isaiah v. Bank Mellat from the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 210
The Saluka monetary award is currently unavailable. 211 It will
be interesting to see if the Tribunal relies on restitution and unjust
enrichment principles in their calculations.
ii. Azurix v. Argentina (Remedy)
In Azurix v Argentina, an ICSID case whose applicable law
was the lex specialis1 2 of the BIT and international law, the
claimant, Azurix, alleged that Argentina violated obligations in
respect to Azurix's investment in an Argentine water treatment
utility. 213 Azurix requested that compensation be based on "unjust
enrichment., 21' Azurix provided the tribunal with a variety of
compensation methods without preference, and the value each
would yield .215 First was the "actual investment" method, $449
million when it acquired the Concession plus $102.4 million in
additional capital contributions to ABA and $15 million in
consequential costs.21 6 Second was the "book value" method,
which provided $516.9, $484.6, $483.9, or $482.2 million, depending
on the date. 217 Lastly, Azurix asked for compensation based on
unjust enrichment:
208. Id. 1 449, n.50.
209. Id.
210. Id. 449, n.51.
211. See id. 91 508 *(noting that "[the] present award [is] only a partial award," the
tribunal retained jurisdiction to decide the outstanding questions of redress).
212. Lex specialis refers to law governing a specific matter in juxtaposition to law
governing general matters.
213. Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 91 3, 58 (U.S.-
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Azurix submits the possibility for the Tribunal to consider
compensation based on unjust enrichment - on the benefits
received by the Province. On this basis, the Province was
enriched by the Canon, the further investment of $102.4 million,
and the time value - interest - of the funds. In the case of the
Canon, Azurix submits that in accordance with the NERA
report, the consideration of the time value would raise it to
$450.5 [million].21 8
Here the claimant misused unjust enrichment, as it failed to
substantiate the value that Argentina received from the funds at
any point in the case. The value Argentina received would be
based on the form of the funds and what Argentina did with those
funds, rather than the amount of money thrown at a State
company. The claimant's oversight enabled the Tribunal to easily
dismiss the claim, first distinguishing damages from unjust
enrichment:
As to compensation on account of an unlawful act, it is based
on the loss suffered, while, in the case of unjust enrichment, it is
based on restitution: for instance, what can be claimed, at least
under some civil law regimes, is restitution of the lower of the
amount contributed by the impoverished or the gain made by
the enriched. 219
The Tribunal's statement might imply that unjust enrichment, and
thus restitution, can be employed only in isolation-or as in some
countries' legal codes, where no other cause of .action can be
brought. This is reflected in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 220 The
Azurix Tribunal, however, was more likely referring to causes of
action under unjust enrichment, which- only allow restitution. In
cases for wrongs, restitution is one of many available
measurements for damages.
Of interest is the Tribunal's reference to civil law regimes'
limitation on restitution for unjust enrichment-it must be the
minimum amount given, as it is "the lower amount contributed by
the impoverished or the gain made by the enriched." 22' If this
principle is applied, investors will only want to employ unjust
218. Id.
219. Id. 436.
220. WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIM TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS, 1981-1991, at 168 (Manchester Univ. Press, 1993).
221. Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 SI 436.
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enrichment damages where no other damages are available, as
unjust enrichment will always, by law, be the smallest award.
Also useful is the tribunal's recycling of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal definition invoked by Saluka. " "The Iran-US Tribunal,
which has dealt with claims based on the principle of unjust
enrichment on several occasions, defined the principle of unjust
enrichment and its applicability as follows .... ,, 22 This may signal
the beginning of universal parameters and acknowledgement of
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as a source of expertise.
After perhaps the most thoughtful and holistic discussion of
unjust enrichment in an ICSID tribunal, the arbitrators
offhandedly dismissed unjust enrichment. 22' The dismissal
probably reflected the claimant's failure to argue the case in terms
of enrichment. The tribunal instead awarded the claimant
$165,240,753 dollars plus compound interest based on the actual
value of the investment. " Of the approximately $165 million
award, $60 million represented the fair market value of the initial
investment2 and $102 million represented additional capital
contributions. 27 Interestingly, the $60 million was only a fraction
of Azurix's initial investment, which it calculated at around $450
million. 2' The amount was reduced because "no well-informed
investor... would have paid for the Concession the price ... paid
by Azurix."' 9 The tribunal qualified this statement, however.
"[T]he Province accepted the price paid by Azurix... and
benefited from the alleged aggressive price paid." " This sentiment
was repeated a paragraph later. "The Tribunal cannot ignore the
fact that.., the Province benefited from the alleged aggressive
price paid."" While this was mentioned in the paragraph just
before awarding the $60 million, it is unclear how the tribunal
factored in the Province's benefit. All that is known is that the
222. Id. 1 437; see also Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, 449 (Partial
Award, registered with Perm Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
223. Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 1 437.
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tribunal did consider the benefit to the Province, and therefore the
award hints at unjust enrichment.
Azurix was one of the first ICSID cases to explicitly explore
unjust enrichment as a compensation tool. Earlier cases, like
Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v.
Republic of Guinea, 2 ("MINE v. Guinea") demonstrate implicit
reliance, and acceptance of unjust enrichment as a principle of
international law.
iii. MINE v. Guinea
The MINE v. Guinea proceedings provide an interesting, if
confusing, portrayal of unjust enrichment principles. In this case, a
dispute arose from an alleged breach by Guinea of a contractual
relationship between the parties. 23 The parties agreed to submit to
ICSID jurisdiction and the contract provided for Guinean law as
the applicable law if the agreement provided no solution for the
dispute. "' An award rendered by a tribunal was partially annulled
by a subsequent Ad Hoc Committee. " In partially annulling the
award, the Committee blamed the Tribunal's failure to state
reasons for its damages calculation. The Committee "finds that to
the extent that the Tribunal purported to state the reasons for its
decision, they were inconsistent and in contradiction with its
analysis of damages theories.''26 Specifically, the Committee
contended:
[T]he damages calculation by the Tribunal... [does] not
purport to estimate profits that SOTRAMAR [Claimant's
company] would have made, but rather take as a base either the
actual or hypothesized profits under the substitute
Afrobulk/Guinomar arrangements. The theory underlying this
approach, which was not articulated either by the parties or by
the Tribunal, may have been that for Guinea to keep the fruits
of the substitute arrangements, which according to the
Tribunal's ruling on breach of contract it had concluded in
violation of the Agreement, would have constituted unjust
enrichment, and that MINE should therefore be awarded the
same share of those profits as it was entitled to receive if they
232. Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 95
(1990) (Annulment Decision).
233. Id. 1.02.
234. Id. TT 1.05,6.36.
235. Id. 8.01.
236. Id. T 6.105.
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had been SOTRAMAR profits. 237
Here, the original tribunal, which for various reasons did not want
to mention unjust enrichment, employed unjust enrichment both
to legitimize and determine damages. Using the gains Guinea
received from its new royalty agreement to estimate damages
meant that the amount Guinea received (or was enriched) were
what MINE was awarded. The original tribunal explained:
The Tribunal finds that MINE's loss of profits may be measured
adequately by the AFROBULK agreement: the 50 cents per
ton which Guinea received from AFROBULK for the right to
carry bauxite under Art. 9 during a two-year period rightfully
belongs to SOTRAMAR. In addition, it seems fair to conclude
that such an arrangement could have been extended, or
negotiated with others, to a total period of 10 years....
The quantity of bauxite carried during the 10-year period under
such an arrangement is 38,437,127 tons; and this tonnage,
multiplied by 50 cents per ton, produces the total due
SOTRAMAR of US$ 19,218,563. Under Art. 9(B) of the
Convention, SOTRAMAR's net profits were to be taxed 30%
by Guinea, and the remaining 70% was to be divided equally
between MINE and Guinea. Therefore MINE is entitled to
35% of the total, producing the principal sum of US$
6,726,497.238
The original award, shown above, was restitution of ill-gotten
gains. The Committee annulled it simply because the Tribunal had
not justified its award.3 9 Notice that the Committee did not
question employing unjust enrichment as justification, only its
undisclosed use. Thus, had the Tribunal employed unjust
enrichment explicitly, rather than simply discarding other options
and calculating an award using no legal explanation, it may not
have been overruled.
iv. Conclusion
These cases show that ICSID tribunals do entertain the
notion that unjust enrichment is a general principle of
international law. ICSID cases are complex both because they rely
on BITs or contracts, and because they are not purely contractual
or off-contract cases. Rather, they combine tort law, property law,
237. Id. 6.106.
238. MINE v. Guinea, XIV Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 82,90 (1989) (Award).
239. MINE v. Guinea, (Annulment Decision) 6.106,6.108.
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contract law, and frustrated contracts. If anything, ICSID cases
need off-contract remedies. Non-ICSID cases involving
international business and frustrated contracts demonstrate the
utility of unjust enrichment for international investment disputes,
relying on unjust enrichment through rules like the Vienna
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. o
While an entryway remains for unjust enrichment as a cause
of action and a measure of damages, ICSID Tribunals have not
employed it. Expropriation's primacy, unjust enrichment's
complex prerequisites, and unjust enrichment's exclusivity may be
explanatory. Also, the inherently moral nature of an unjust
enrichment decision may dissuade tribunals from invoking it.
Regardless, even under ICSID, the door is open-and one might
see a claim with speculative losses employ unjust enrichment to
calculate damages. 
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal also dealt with investment
disputes and effectively incorporated unjust enrichment. ,24 Indeed,
as later ICSID cases demonstrate when citing Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal parameters, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cemented
universal parameters. 243
Standardization prevented the cherry picking that equitable
concepts can introduce. If anything, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
shows the effectiveness of considered application of unjust
enrichment. Exploring the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal case law
introduces the universal parameters for unjust enrichment in
international investment disputes.
240. See generally Harry Flechtner, Effects of Avoidance, Articles 79-88, in THE
DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS, AND UNRESOLVED
ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION, 818, 841-61 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner,
Ronald A. Brand eds., Sellier. Eur. L. Publishers 2004).
241. This is especially true given recent decisions in which the tribunal assumes a great
deal of leeway on award calculations. These cases, including Azurix and LG&E, cite S.D.
Myers. According to Azurix, "in S.D. Myers the tribunal considered that the lack of a
measure of compensation in NAFTA for breaches other than a finding of expropriation
reflected the intention of the parties to leave it open to the tribunals to determine it in
light of the circumstances of the case taking into account the principles of international
law and the provisions of NAFTA." Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12 422
(citing S.D. Myers, 1 303-319 (2000) (Award)).
242. See infra Part II.B.5 for full exploration.
243. Id.
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5. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was created in the wake of the
1979-1981 hostage crisis. " The tribunal aimed to settle contract,
property, and debt claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, and vice
versa, as well as contractual disputes between the two states. ' The
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is a mixed tribunal, composed of nine
judges: three Iranian, three American, and three others. While
the Tribunal relies on international law, it employs Iranian and
U.S. law to fill voids. 247
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal solidified and fleshed out
unjust enrichment as a cause of action in the international arena.24
If Professor Kull's argument that unjust enrichment and restitution
are inseparable is convincing, 249 then the distinction between unjust
enrichment as a cause of action and as a remedy is merely
semantic. Nevertheless, a practical framework for allowing unjust
enrichment as a cause of action is vital in limiting abuse. The Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal was very careful in creating boundaries for
its application. As cited in Saluka, " Isaiah v. Bank Mellat
recognized five prerequisites, which later cases elaborated on and
fine-tuned, ultimately creating a solid set of transplantable unjust
enrichment parameters. " These requirements, summarized in Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, set unjust enrichment apart from other
remedies that could also independently form a cause of action.
There must have been an enrichment of one party to the
detriment of the other, and both must arise as a
consequence of the same act or event. There must be no
244. See Background Information: Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, supra note 45.
245. Id.
246. MAPP, supra note 220, at 30.
247. See id. at 105-07.
248. Id. at 212-16. But see id. at 211 (explaining that other international arbiters have
not understood unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action). Unlike western
legal systems, Shari'ah law does not embrace the concept of interest. Interest is money
made without work. Shari'ah law forbids money thus made. See A1-Rifaee, supra note 70,
at 20. The resurgence of Shari'ah law in Muslim countries complicates international
business transactions -particularly given this concept. In fact, Iran-US Tribunal's
acceptance of unjust enrichment claims might be motivated by their need to balance
international with national laws. Balancing U.S. common law with Iranian Shari'ah law
may have demanded creativity and reliance on less common general principles-such as
unjust enrichment.
249. See supra Part II.A.2.
250. See supra Part II.A.2, at note 47.
251. Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 232, 236-37 (1983).
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justification for the enrichment, and no contractual or other
remedy available to the injured party whereby he might
seek compensation from the party enriched. 1
2
According to Wayne Mapp, in The Iran-United States Claim
Tribunal. the First Ten Years:
The Sealand claim also included expropriation as a cause of
action, and apart from the duty to compensate, expropriation is
not necessarily a breach of international law. Although there is
a close relationship between causes of action founded on
expropriation and unjust enrichment they have been perceived
by the Tribunal as quite separate. Thus the Tribunal has
awarded compensation to claimants if the respondent state has
been enriched at the expense of the claimant, whether or not
the respondent state has committed any act of expropriation . "
3
Practically, this means that under ICSID and other
international investment dispute resolution rules, an unjust
enrichment claim would only occur where no expropriation claim
is possible. Expropriation claims are well defined, explicitly
endorsed causes of action, whereas unjust enrichment remains
unclear. The primacy of expropriation may explain the relatively
slim role of unjust enrichment, as a case would only be brought
where the state was enriched without expropriation. The utility of
unjust enrichment is further limited by inherent requirements such
as causation between loss and gain, the exclusion of other
remedies and causes of action, and policy pitfalls. The concept of
unjust enrichment, however, underlies many expropriation claims.
What distinguishes unjust enrichment claims from
expropriation, then, is probably the nature of the respondent
State's gain, as well as the type of property the claimant possessed.
It is unclear whether intellectual property can be expropriated. If
so, then in some intellectual property cases, property rights may be
established where there is a patent or copyright, allowing for
expropriation. In other cases, know-how or other benefits may not
have a legal property right attached, so unjust enrichment would
be the only cause of action, as unjust enrichment requires no
illegal action. If intellectual property cannot be expropriated, then
all intellectual property disputes must be brought as unjust
252. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 149,169 (1984) (emphasis
added).
253. MAPP, supra note 220, at 214.
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enrichment claims. As will be explored in Part III, using unjust
enrichment as a cause of action will allow the claimant to get
through jurisdictional thresholds where expropriation may not. In
addition, unjust enrichment claims are not limited to restitution at
the time of the taking, unlike most BIT remedies for legal
expropriation.
Regarding unjust enrichment and contracts, Lockheed
Corporation v. Iran24 confirmed earlier decisions " forbidding
unjust enrichment where a contract existed:
First, as the Tribunal has held in other cases, the Claimant must
establish that there is no valid and enforceable contract on
which an action for damages could be based.... Second, the
Claimant must establish that the Respondent has been enriched
at the Claimant's expense, the extent of such enrichment and
that it would be unfair for the Respondent not to pay for the
benefits it has received. 256
Mapp adds:
The doctrine of unjust enrichment as an independent cause of
action has been progressively developed by the Tribunal....
[I]n Schlegel Corporation v National Iranian Copper Industries
Company[, the] Tribunal.... observed that the rule against
unjust enrichment represents a principle based on justice and
equity and therefore makes it necessary to take into account all
the circumstances of each specific situation. 257
In sum, unjust enrichment claims can only be made where there is
no claim for expropriation, where there is no contract, and where
the five prerequisites are met.
In addition to setting clear parameters for bringing unjust
enrichment claims, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases by default also
explore unjust enrichment award calculations. These calculations
vary significantly according to the factual circumstances of the
case. As well, there is general judicial debate over correct
computation. The tribunal in Sea-Land pointed out:
Opinions differ as to the basis of computation of damages. The
254. Lockheed Corp. v. Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 292 (1988). Unjust enrichment
was found inapplicable in this case because there was an existing contract.
255. E.g., T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep., 160 (1984); Future Trading,
Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 46 (1985).
256. Lockheed, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 309 (internal citation omitted).
257. MAPP, supra note 220, at 215 (citing Schlegel Corp., 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at
176, 181 (1981)).
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predominant view seems to be that damages should be assessed
to reflect the extent by which the state has been enriched. Judge
Jimenez de Ar~chaga considers that where the "enriched" state
has obtained no benefit, no compensation should be payable at
all. 2 8
This limits both where unjust enrichment is applicable and the
amount awarded. The Sea-Land Tribunal continued exploring
award calculations, stating:
Equity clearly requires that cognisance be taken of the de facto
situation, and this explains why there is no discernible
uniformity in the practice of international tribunals in this
respect. Important factual circumstances to be taken into
account are the level of investment; the period during which the
foreign investor has been able to make a profit; and the benefit
actually derived by the host country from its acquisition.59
Applying these considerations to the Sea-Land facts, the Tribunal
held:
Compensation for unjust enrichment cannot encompass
damages for loss of future profits. The Tribunal must aim
instead to place a monetary value on the extent to which PSO
[Iranian Ports and Shipping Organization] was enriched by its
premature acquisition of the facility.
The Tribunal must establish whether PSO did in fact avail itself
of the facility after Sea-Land's departure. PSO in its Statement
of Defence denies having used the installations and facilities at
the terminal but there is some evidence that it did make use of
them. 20
The tribunal here estimated that premature use of the Sea-
Land facility enriched the PSO by approximately $750,000. 261 This
figure comes from the tribunal's projected gain-based on PSO
documents discussing what PSO could have gained during the 611-
day period that Sea-Land remained unexploited (which the
tribunal used to estimate the profits that occurred when PSO later
began exploitation), coupled with documents showing that there
was in fact a subsequent exploitation. "
258. Sea-Land Serv., Inc, 6 Iran-U.S. C. Trib. Rep. at 169 (footnote omitted).
259. Id. at 170.
260. Id. at 170-71.
261. Id. at 175.
262. Id. at 171-72.
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The Sea-Land Tribunal, however, did not allow recovery for
lost moveable property in the instant case. The Sea-Land Tribunal
explained:
[U]njust enrichment requires that Sea-Land be compensated
for those items and assets left in Iran of which PSO or the
Government obtained the use and benefit. It does not permit
the Tribunal to compensate Sea-Land for the loss of unpaid
debts, freight charges, and termination expenses, none of which
resulted in the enrichment of PSO or the Government.
In this case, the tribunal found no evidence that Iran had used the
property left by Sea-Land. Compensation for garage inventory and
other equipment was similarly denied.
The tribunal concluded that "[t]he Ports and Shipping
Organization [PSO] is obligated to pay Sea-Land Service, Inc.
Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand United States Dollars (US
$750,000.00)." " This award reflected only the value of the
estimated early use of the property, and did not give any money
for lost equipment or lost future profits.
In contrast, the Schlegel Tribunal based its award on quantum
meruit. ' There, Schlegel was a subcontractor and wanted to be
paid for building a reservoir lining for the Copper Company, with
whom it had no contract.267 Schlegel's contract was between
Schlegel and another contractor. 2 Because no contract existed
between the Copper Company and Schlegel, the case was
considered off-contract, allowing for an unjust enrichment claim:269
When Schlegel had performed its work, the result was that the
Copper Company had acquired a reservoir lining to its
specifications provided by a company it had effectively
nominated to do work supervised and approved by its own
engineers.
The Tribunal finds that the enrichment was and remains unjust.
The evidence is clear that the Copper Company has never paid
the balance due for Schlegel's work. Nor is there any doubt,
given Binnie's issuance of the Maintenance Certificate, that
Schlegel's work had been satisfactorily completed.... The
263. Id. at 172.
264. Id. at 173.
265. Id. at 175.
266. See generally Schlegel Corp., 14 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. at 176.
267. See id. 91 5.
268. See id. 1$ 5-8.
269. See id. $ 10-14.
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Tribunal concludes under the circumstances that, once the work
had been completed by the sub-contractor Schlegel, and it had
for good and valid reasons appealed to the Copper Company
for payment directly, it was manifestly unjust for the Copper
Company to deny payment to Schlegel under Article 59(2),
particularly when it would not have incurred any loss to itself by
doing so. The Tribunal holds, consequently, that the Copper
Company has been unjustly enriched and must therefore pay
Schlegel the balance due of 12,934,124 rials. 7 0
Here, the tribunal awarded the balance owed Schlegel for
their work plus 10.5 percent interest per annum. 27 This award
resembles a damages award, given that Schlegel received what was
owed them in their contract. Like many quantum meruit cases, the
tribunal based the value of the labor on the price fixed by the
contract. 12 Therefore, even though the award resembled damages,
it was calculated on the value to the respondent, which just
happened to equal the amount owed the claimant. This distinction
is important because in the second instance (restitution), if the
Copper Company never used the reservoir, there would be no
award.
In Isaiah v. Bank Mellat, the claimant, Benjamin Isaiah,
sought relief from Bank Mellat in the payment of $380,000 - the
amount of a dishonored check drawn by Bank Mellat's
predecessor.273 Isaiah "asserted that the check was not paid
because of expropriation of the assets and properties of the Bank
by the Government of Iran." 274 The tribunal here "believe[d] that
it would be inequitable for such a bank to be able to escape
liability to the beneficial owner of the funds represented by such a
dishonored check and retain the funds to which the bank has no
claim." 21 Consequently, "the Tribunal h[eld] that the Respondent
Bank Mellat has wrongfully detained Mr. Isaiah's $380,000 since
10 January 1979 and that Isaiah is entitled to an award in that
amount." .6 The tribunal, however, declined to award interest:
270. Id. If 16-17 (footnote omitted).
271. Id. 20.
272. See, e.g., Bradkin v. Leverton, 257 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that if
plaintiff's allegations were true, he would be entitled to recover as damages the amount
that the defendant had contractually obligated itself to pay).
273. Isaiah, 2 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 232-33,235.
274. Id. at 233.
275. Id. at 237.
276. Id. at 239.
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The award of interest is certainly permissible in the discretion
of the Tribunal. In this case there is no evidence that the
International Bank of Iran or its successor, Bank Mellat,
deliberately deprived the Claimant of his money; on the
contrary, the evidence indicates that the Bank made
unsuccessful efforts to restore its credit facilities with Chase
Manhattan Bank so that the check could be paid. In view of the
special circumstances in this case, the Tribunal declines to
award interest. 27
All of these cases present facts demanding different award
calculations for unjust enrichment. Each tribunal tailored the
award to fit the facts of the case. Benjamin Isaiah simply got his
money back. Schlegel received the value of its labor, which had
been done expressly for the benefit of the Copper Company. In
Sea-Land, the tribunal approximated the value that PSO received
from prematurely occupying a facility.
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal set out clear tenets for unjust
enrichment as a cause of action. 278 The most important tenet is that
unjust enrichment can only be brought where no other cause of
action is available. 279 Thus, claimants cannot bypass contracts to get
better results through an off-contract cause of action. This both
protects the integrity of the contract and confines unjust
enrichment claims.
In addition, unjust enrichment claims house internal
restrictions. By law, unjust enrichment claims only get restitution
(monetary or otherwise). Restitution occurs only where the
respondent actually gained something, and thus, the respondent
will never pay more than they have profited, unlike damages
claims. This ensures that the remedy corresponds to the violation.
If the violation is not necessarily illegal, a damages award might
deliver unjust results.
277. Id.
278. When taken together, Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Iran, Schlegel Corp. v. Natl Iranian
Copper Indus., and Isaiah v. Bank Mellat set forth distinct parameters.
279. Lockheed, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 309 ("First, as the Tribunal has held in
other cases, the Claimant must establish that there is no valid and enforceable contract on
which an action for damages could be based .... Second, the Claimant must establish that
the Respondent has been enriched at the Claimant's expense, the extent of such
enrichment and that it would be unfair for the Respondent not to pay for the benefits it
has received.") (citation omitted).
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a
(Discussion Draft 2000).
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ICSID tribunals should employ the detailed parameters set
out by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Some additional issues,
however, require addressing. First, is unjust enrichment an
acceptable cause of action under ICSID rules? If so, how would
one bring it and what barriers need to be confronted? Last, what
are the tenets of unjust enrichment within ICSID cases?
III. HYPOTHETICALS: UNJUST ENRICHMENT APPLIED
A small subset of cases would benefit from unjust enrichment
claims-cases that otherwise might not fall within a tribunal's
jurisdiction or cases where damages would not appropriately
redress the grievance. This Part refers specifically to off-contract
intellectual property disputes, where the value of the respondent
country's benefit exceeds the claimant's loss.
A successful claim must meet ICSID jurisdictional
requirements. Thus, a claimant must show:
(i) that there was a dispute;
(ii) that the dispute was a legal one;
(iii) that the dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an
investment; and
(iv) that there was an investment out of which a legal dispute
has directly arisen. 281
A successful claim under unjust enrichment takes the
following form. First, there must a dispute. Second, the dispute
must be legal. As explored below, this requires finding a clause in
the BIT that the respondent violated. Here, I argue that the
applicable clause is the "fair and equitable treatment standard."
The "fair and equitable treatment standard" requires that
signatory nations not violate customary international law with
respect to investors from contracting states. ' If unjust enrichment
is part of customary international law, then it is protected under
the fair and equitable treatment standard. This requires two steps:
(1) the claimant must show that unjust enrichment is a part of
customary international law, and (2) the claimant must show that
281. Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310,
31 (2004) (Decision on Award of March 15, 2002). See also Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, art.
25(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 523 U.N.T.S. 93 ("The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment. ) [hereinafter Washington
Convention].
282. See Kreindler, supra note 9.
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unjust enrichment, as understood by international law, occurred.
Thus, the claimant must have a case that fulfills the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal tenets for unjust enrichment:
(1) There must be an enrichment;
(2) With a corresponding loss;
(3) Close causal connection between the loss and the
enrichment;
(4) No justification for the enrichment; and,
(5) No other available cause of action.
A contract claim, however, cannot rely on unjust enrichment;
unjust enrichment can only be brought in isolation. 
In addition to just being good law, these parameters serve to
weed out frivolous cases, contractual cases, and cases that might
fall under another BIT standard. This makes unjust enrichment a
cause of action and remedy for those who would otherwise have
no voice, because they only occur where "no other cause of action
is available."
Fulfilling the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal parameters for unjust
enrichment claims has the secondary benefit of ensuring that the
larger claim meets most of ICSID's jurisdictional requirements.
The requirements that the respondent state "be enriched" and that
there be a "close causal connection between the loss and the
enrichment" dovetail with ICSID jurisdictional requirements.
Namely, that "the dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of
an investment;" and that there be "an investment out of which a
legal dispute has directly arisen."
As well, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal unjust enrichment
requirement that there be a "corresponding loss" addresses a
concern particular to NAFTA. NAFTA Article 1116: Claim by an
Investor of a Party on Its Own Behalf, states that: "An investor of
a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that
another Party has breached an obligation.., and that the investor
has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that
breach." ' Here, NAFTA requires that the investor "incur loss or
damage" to bring a claim. Put simply, this NAFTA requirement is
satisfied because it is intrinsic to unjust enrichment, as a valid
claim requires that the investor suffer a "corresponding loss."
283. See Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, T 449 (Partial Award, registered
with Perm. Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
284. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1116(1), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 642-43.
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Having met all four jurisdictional requirements for ICSID and
assuming a victory on the merits, only the remedy remains. Even
though "fair and equitable treatment" violations give a great deal
of judicial discretion relative to remedies, unjust enrichment claims
should only receive restitution/unjust enrichment. This is because,
as explored above, the two are inseparable. The entire unjust
enrichment claim is spent proving an enrichment to the other
party, of which the claimant deserves a part. Thus, asking to be
compensated for loss would be unsubstantiated and inapt. In many
ways, bringing a claim for unjust enrichment under the umbrella of
"fair and equitable treatment," is the same as asking for unjust
enrichment as a remedy. As well, part of what makes unjust
enrichment fair is that the claimant can only get compensation
based on what the respondent gained, so countries will not be
forced to pay out money they never had.
The argument outlined above is explored in detail below. To
illustrate how the limitations listed above and others will interact
with ICSID requirements, I present a series of hypotheticals based
on Mihaly International Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri
Lanka. 285
A. Mihaly
Mihaly International Corporation brought a claim against Sri
Lanka for violation of the United States-Sri Lanka BIT. Mihaly
sought compensation for its pre-contractual investment made
during negotiations to build a new power plant on a Build-Own
Transfer ("BOT") basis. " In 1992, Sri Lanka solicited bids for the
project, eventually selecting Mihaly. During the negotiations
Mihaly engaged in extensive planning and projections including
the plant design and financial projections.' Mihaly valued its pre-
contractual efforts to design and plan the plant at two to four
285. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310.
286. Id. T 1.
287. Id. T1 11. According to the World Bank in the context of water utility contracts,
Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) Contracts are "Typically used for water supply or wastewater
treatment plants. An operator finances, builds, owns, and operates the facilities for a
specific period of time, after which ownership is transferred back to the contracting
authority. BOT payments are typically based on the volume of water treated at the plant."
GREG J. BROWDER ET AL., STEPPING UP: IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF CHINA'S
URBAN WATER FACILITIES 118 (The World Bank 2007).
288. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 at 9I 38-42.
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percent of the $400 million projected budget. Negotiations failed
after a few years, and no contract was signed. 2 o
Mihaly claimed that Sri Lanka violated the BIT requirement
of fair and equitable treatment because it was never compensated
for its pre-contractual expenditures, which it considered an
investment. 29' The Tribunal, however, found that pre-contractual
expenses were not an "investment" protected by the BIT, as.
defined by the Washington Convention. 292 Since Sri Lanka never
signed a contract, it never agreed to ICSID jurisdiction. "The
operation of SAEC [South Asia Electricity Company] was
contingent upon the final conclusion of the contract with Sri
Lanka, thus the expenditures for its creation would not be
regarded as an investment until admitted by Sri Lanka." 
293
Unjust enrichment was inapplicable in the Mihaly case, as Sri
Lanka did not benefit from Mihaly's plans. If, however, Sri Lanka
had used the plans to create a power plant, then Mihaly would
have an excellent cause of action under unjust enrichment. Unlike
awarding pre-contractual damages, which would open the
floodgates for a new array of lawsuits, unjust enrichment claims
bring with them inherent limitations.
B. Mihaly 1
Assume that all the Mihaly case facts remain, save one. In the
new hypothetical Mihaly, "Mihaly 1," Sri Lanka used Mihaly l's
plans to build the power plant-without compensating Mihaly 1.
The substantive case is as follows.
Sri Lanka was unjustly enriched at the expense of Mihaly 1
because Sri Lanka benefited from Mihaly l's property without
compensation. Mihaly 1 suffered a corresponding loss of both
potential profits from the plant and more importantly from the
two to four percent costs of their uncompensated outlay in
creating the plan. In addition, there was significant causal
connection between Mihaly l's loss and Sri Lanka's gain, as Sri
Lanka was able to use Mihaly l's work and outlay to create a
289. Id. IT 34,41.
290. Id. 47.
291. Id. 34, 53.
292. Id. 59; See generally Washington Convention, supra note 281. The Washington
Convention of 1965 established ICSID as a dispute resolution forum for investor-State
disputes.
293. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 at 48.
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power plant benefiting Sri Lanka. As well, given the facts of
Mihaly, none of the defenses apply (illegal activity, duress, etc.),
since Sri Lanka had a public bid for the project. Last, claimant has
no other cause of action, as the claim was not based on a contract,
and was not illegal.
While the substantive claim, based on the merits, seems
relatively simple, the threshold jurisdictional barriers in ICSID
present substantial complications. In addition to proving the claim
on its merits, Mihaly 1 must show that its pre-contractual expenses,
which led to an unjust enrichment for Sri Lanka, are considered an
investment under the BIT. Mihaly 1 must also show that there is a
valid legal dispute, meaning that unjust enrichment violates one of
the BIT provisions.
Jurisdiction presents a series of obstacles, one of which is
inconsistency. Arbitral panels are still debating whether the
Washington Convention provides additional limitations to BITs'
lex specialis. Accordingly, jurisdictional thresholds must be
examined under both the Washington Convention and the lex
specialis of the applicable BIT. In many instances where the two
overlap or one is silent, they can be considered as a unitary
threshold for jurisdiction.
The Washington Convention, Article 25, states that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State... and a
national of another Contracting State.""29 The underlined phrase
contains the constitutive elements of the basis for subject-matter
jurisdiction.295 The Mihaly Tribunal found that Mihaly was "a
national of another Contracting state" and therefore the only
relevant jurisdictional issue in the hypothetical is subject-matter
jurisdiction. 29 To get subject-matter jurisdiction, the claimant must
show:
(i) that there was a dispute;
(ii) that the dispute was a legal one;
(iii) that the dispute arises directly and not indirectly out of an
investment; and
(iv) that there was an investment out of which a legal dispute
has directly arisen.29'
294. Washington Convention, supra note 281, at art. 25(1) (emphasis added).
295. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 at 29.
296. See id. 11-27.
297. Id. 31.
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1. Jurisdiction
In exploring jurisdiction, three concepts must be examined:
(1) the Washington Convention Article 25 definition of
investment, (2) the BIT lex specialis definition of investment, and
(3) the scope of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard.
i. Washington Convention Requirements: Investment
The crux of the original Mihaly case was establishing that an
"investment" occurred:
The most crucial and controversial contentions of the Parties
were concentrated upon the existence vel non of an
"investment".... A fortiorissime, without proof of an
"investment" under Article 25(1), neither Party need to argue
further, for without such an "investment", there can be no
dispute, legal or otherwise, arising directly or indirectly out of
it, which could be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Centre
and the Tribunal. 298
As discussed above, the fact that the tribunal did not consider a
pre-contractual expense without benefit an "investment"
motivated the tribunal's refusal to give Mihaly jurisdiction. 2 In
Mihaly 1, however, Sri Lanka benefiting unjustly from the pre-
contractual expense transforms the nature of the claim to include
the requisite "investment." Indeed, the Washington Convention
lets the parties determine what constitutes an "investment,"
leading to amorphous requirements. " The reading in Mihaly,
broadly referred to as the "Salini Test," is perhaps the most
demanding reading of Washington Convention requirements. 3 '
Although recent tribunals have reduced these requirements, 0 2 the
most rigid understanding is arguably the best starting point.
298. Id. 32.
299. See id.
300. See Washington Convention, supra note 281, at Part B Art. 27 ("No attempt was
made to define the term "investment" given the essential requirement of consent by the
parties, and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known in
advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not consider
submitting to the Centre (Article 25(4))."). Many scholars think that BIT definitions of
investment govern. The Mihaly Tribunal thought otherwise, as will be explored later.
301. See Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng'rs v. Albania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
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The tribunal in Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Egypt
explained "that to be characterized as an investment a project
must show a certain duration, a regularity of profit and return, an
element of risk, a substantial commitment, and a significant
contribution to the host State's development."3 3 In sum, the
unmodified "Salini Test" requires that an investment must (1)
have a certain duration, (2) have risk (3) have regularity of profit
and return, (4) be a substantial commitment, and (5) contribute to
the host State's development.
Mitchell v. Congo provides a more nuanced reading of these
requirements:
There are four characteristics of investment identified by ICSID
case law and commented on by legal doctrine, but in reality
they are interdependent and are consequently examined
comprehensively. The first characteristic of investment is the
commitment of the investor, which may be financial or through
work; indeed, in several ICSID cases the investor's commitment
mainly consisted in its know-how. "4
Many pre-contractual investments, such as obtaining industrial
designs and specialized knowledge, might be considered
intellectual property such as trade secrets or "know-how." The
Mitchell Tribunal's broad reference to "know-how" in defining
"work" and its flexible reading of the four investment
characteristics provide an opening for unjust enrichment claims in
cases where the BIT does not explicitly recognize intellectual
property, and/or where the intellectual property rights were not
patented.
The Mitchell Tribunal continued: "Other characteristics of
investment are the duration of the project and the economic risk
entailed, in the sense of an uncertainty regarding its successful
outcome. The fourth characteristic of investment is the
contribution to the economic development of the host country." 305
303. Helnan Int'l Hotels A/S v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/19, 77
(2006) (Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction) (internal quotations and
citation omitted), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVa=show
Doc&docld=DC773_En&caseld=C64.
304. Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
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Note that the location of the investment and the amount actually
invested in the project are not listed criteria. While they may help
a claim, a claim can succeed with little financial investment and
where that investment is primarily made in a country other than
the respondent country. "
The Mitchell Tribunal emphasized the importance of the
"contribution to the economic development of the host state." 30 In
support, the tribunal pointed to Fedax v. Venezuela, 38 "which
involved promissory notes issued by the Republic of Venezuela,"
and CSOB v. Slovakia,3o which involved a loan. 30 In CSOB, the
tribunal found that "under certain circumstances a loan may
contribute substantially to a State's economic development.." .. As
well, the Mitchell Tribunal held that "the contribution," though
"essential," does not have to be "sizeable or successful."31 2 In
addition:
[O]f course, ICSID tribunals do not have to evaluate the real
contribution of the operation in question. It suffices for the
operation to contribute in one way or another to the economic
development of the host State, and this concept of economic
development is, in any event, extremely broad but also variable
depending on the case.
Returning to the hypothetical, if the Mihaly 1 Tribunal relied
on the aforementioned reading of the Washington Convention
criteria, it would find that an "investment" had occurred because
the relevant criteria have been satisfied:
306. See, e.g., SGS Socidt6 G6n6rale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/13 (2003) (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVa=show
Doc&docld=DC622_En&caseId=C205.
307. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 T 33.
308. Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 186 (2002) (Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction).
309. Ceskoslovenska obchodni Banka, A.S v. Sovak Republic, 14ICSID (W. Bank)
Rev.-FILJ 251, 1 77 (1999) (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC556_En&caseld=C160.
310. Cf. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 9 30.
311. Ceskoslovenska obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/97/4 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of May 24, 1999), republished
in 14 ICSID REV.-FILJ 251, 277 para. 77 (1999).
312. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 33.
313. Id.
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(1) Investment. At its most demanding, the commitment must
be "substantial."3"' Substantial investment occurred over the
course of the negotiations. Mihaly l's expert calculated that two to
four percent of its expenditures occurred in the planning phase. 3 5
As well, "it is standard practice accepted by host governments,
lenders and other equity investment to include the sponsors'
development expenditures in the investment cost." 3 6 Even if the
monetary expenditure did not suffice, the Mitchell Tribunal
highlights many cases that consider "work" and/or "know-how" to
constitute "investment." The extensive planning, financial
projections, and plant design appropriated by the government
from Mihaly 1 certainly fit the Mitchell know-how description.
(2) Duration. The one to two years that Mihaly 1 spent
developing the plans for a power plant should suffice in terms of
duration, especially considering their long-term goals. As the
Mitchell Tribunal stated, "ICSID tribunals do not have to evaluate
the real contribution of the operation in question." 7
(3) Risk. Investments, particularly in the BOT format, present
a significant risk to the initial investor, who bears the risk of
unforeseeable events, such as natural disasters and war, which
would increase the project's costs.
(4) Contribution to economic development of host State.
According to Mitchell, economic development is a broad
concept. 318 Mihaly 1, however, does not require a broad reading of
economic development. Economic development occurred prima
facie in Mihaly 1-the entire case surrounds the host State's
enjoyment of an enrichment. Sri Lanka utilizing Mihaly l's plans
clearly contributed to its economic development, even if the
contribution by Mihaly 1 was involuntary. Of course, Mihaly l's
initial intent was to do the same. It is precisely this actual
contribution to Sri Lanka's economic development coupled with
Mihaly l's know-how investment that separates Mihaly from
Mihaly 1. In Mihaly there is no economic contribution and no
contract. In Mihaly 1, there is a provable and substantial economic
contribution.
314. Helnan v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/05/19 77.
315. See Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 34.
316. Id.
317. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 33.
318. See id.
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Fulfilling the Washington Convention requirements is vital
for Mihaly l's case, even if the BIT includes provisions for know-
how or business "interests." Although some tribunals have held
that BIT definitions of investment preempt the Washington
Convention, the tribunal in Mihaly found that the BIT language
did not apply because a contract had not been entered into. 319 This
is because in addition to the Washington Convention
requirements, a claimant must demonstrate that the State's action
breached a requirement within the BIT. Thus, Mihaly 1 must find
a hook for unjust enrichment within the BIT.
In sum, once Mihaly 1 proves that its pre-contractual
expenses meet the Washington Convention components for
"investment" (whether the tribunal uses the "Salini Test" or not),
the tribunal must determine whether the work completed by
Mihaly 1 falls under the BIT's definition of "investment."
ii. BIT Definitions of Investment
Typically, BITs offer generous definitions of "investment." In
CSOB v. Slovakia, for example, the BIT defined "investment" as
''any asset" including: "monetary receivables -or claims to any
performance related to an investment.. 321 The CSOB Tribunal
held that the BIT terms were broad enough to encompass loans,
but that not "any loan" meets the requirement of an investment
under the Washington Convention. 321 Additionally, in Helnan, the
tribunal found that broad language such "as 'asset', 'any other
rights', 'any similar rights', 'pursuant to a contract having an
economic value'... shows that Article 1 [of the Egypt BIT]
encompass[es] wide concepts."322 Hence, if the Mihaly 1 Tribunal
believed that lex specialis governed, the claimant would have an
easier case to make.
The BIT in SGS v. Pakistan also boasted a broad definition of
investment. "'Investment' is defined so as to... include every kind
of asset and particularly.., claims to money or to any
performance having economic value.., as well as all other rights
given by law, by contract or by decision of the authority in
319. See Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 47,59-61.
320. Ceskoslovenska, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/4 77.
321. Id.
322. Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/05/19, 79 (2006) (Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to Jurisdiction).
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accordance with the law."" This "non-exhaustive" definition was,
according to the tribunal, "sufficiently broad to encompass the PSI
agreement." 32" As well, relying on lex specialis, the SGS Tribunal
found for the claimant, even though SGS invested very little in
Pakistan itself. 32
Likewise, the PSEG Global v. Turkey Tribunal stated in dicta
that "[a]n investment can take many forms before actually
reaching the construction stage, including more notably the cost of
negotiations and other preparatory work leading to the
materialization of the Project, even in connection with pre-
investment expenditures." 121 While the tribunal recognized that a
valid contract was signed, as distinguished from Mihaly where one
was not, it nevertheless pointed out that "in Mihaly the decision
did in fact consider that it might well be the case in other
investments that the moneys spent or expenses incurred in their
preparation can be swept under the umbrella of such
investment." 1
27
In PSEG, the tribunal found jurisdiction even though no work
had been done. This decision was likely correct, given the BIT's
definition of investment:
'Investment' means every kind of asset in the territory of one
Party owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals or
companies of the other Party, including assets, equity, debt,
claims and service and investment contracts; and includes: (i)
tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as
mortgages, liens and pledges; (ii) a company or shares of stock
or other interests in a company or other interests in the assets
thereof; (iii) a claim to money or claim to performance having
economic value and associated with the investment; (iv)
intellectual property and industrial property rights, including
rights with respect to copyrights, patents, trademark, trade
names, industrial designs, trade secrets and know-how, and
goodwill; (v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any
licenses and permits pursuant to law; and (vi) reinvestment of
323. SGS Socit6 G6ndrale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/13, 134 (2003) (.Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction) (emphasis omitted).
324. Id. 135.
325. See id." 134-135, 140.
326. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/5,
1 304 (2007) (Award), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC630_En&caseld=C212.
327. Id. S 302.
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returns, and of principal and interest payments arising under
loan agreements.
The above example of BIT language provides a number of
options for Mihaly 1. Mihaly l's building and financial plans are
"industrial designs" and "know-how" that fit squarely within the
definition of "intellectual property." As well, the right to
compensation where one profits from another's design is "a right
conferred by law" in many countries. 329 Last, an industrial design
or a company's outlay, from which another company benefited,
could be considered both "interests in the assets of a company"
and "a claim to money or to performance having economic value."
These options do not apply to the original Mihaly because the host
country did not use the designs. Therefore, there was no
"intellectual property right," "know-how," or "assets" in a going
concern. The actual use of the investment is the lynchpin to be
deemed an "investment."
Having found that Mihaly l's building and financial plans
qualify as a protected "investment," both under the Washington
Convention and under typical BIT language, the plans must next
be examined under the Washington Convention jurisdictional
requirements. The first requirements explored are that the dispute
arises directly out of an investment, and that the dispute was a legal
one. ' Fulfilling this requirement necessitates analyzing the "fair
and equitable treatment standard."
328. Id. 66 (citing Article I(1)(c) of the BIT).
329. This is certainly true for any country that is a member of the WTO. Article 25(1)
of the TRIPS Agreement obliges Members to provide for the protection of independently
created industrial designs that are new or original. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
art. 25(1), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). As well, the TRIPS Agreement requires
undisclosed information -- trade secrets or know-how -- to benefit from protection. Id. at
art. 39(2). Furthermore, Article 45 stipulates: "(1) The judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate
for the injury the right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that person's
intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to
know, engaged in infringing activity. (2) The judicial authorities shall also have the
authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include
appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate cases, Members may authorize the judicial
authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages even
where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in
infringing activity." Id. at art. 45.
330. See Washington Convention, supra note 281, at art. 25(1).
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iii. Washington Convention Requirements: That the Dispute
Arises Directly and Not Indirectly out of an Investment.
In the current hypothetical, the dispute arises out of Sri
Lanka's direct benefit from Mihaly l's investment. Thus, a causal
connection is established. Indeed, unjust enrichment claims per se
require a causal connection between the claimant's loss and the
unjustified enrichment. The necessity that a dispute arise directly
out of an investment complicates cases where a third party benefits
from the investment, as "Mihaly 2" will explore.
iv. Washington Convention Requirements: That the Dispute Was
a Legal One: Fair and Equitable Treatment.
A violation of local law or even a general principle of law is
not enough to get jurisdiction under ICSID.33' The respondent
country must violate something that a tribunal understands to be
contained within an article of the BIT. 332 Investors, then, must find
a hook to hang their unjust enrichment claim on within the BIT.
For Mihaly 1, a violation of the "fair and equitable treatment"
standard is the simplest.
Fair and equitable treatment is a provision in BITs, requiring,
at a minimum, that a signatory State not violate principles of
customary international law with respect to investors from another
signatory State. 313 Application of the "fair and equitable
treatment" standard varies between tribunals. In general, the
varied application can be viewed under three categories: broad,
moderate, and narrow. The narrowest reading is that "the
obligation to treat an investment fairly and equitably refers to the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens under customary
331. See e.g., R. DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD, WILLIAM REISMAN, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, at 344 (Kluwer Law
International 2005) ("In answering this question the Tribunal believes that it is correct to
distinguish between rights and obligations that are applicable to legal or natural persons
who are within the reach of a host State's jurisdiction, as a matter of general law; and
rights and obligations that are applicable to an investor as a consequence of an investment
agreement entered into with that host state. Legal disputes relating to the latter will fall
under Article 25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes concerning the former in principle
fall to be decided by the appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the
general law generates an investment dispute under the Convention").
332. See, e.g, Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka, 6 ICSID (W.
Bank) 310 at 52-54 (2004) (Decision on Award of March 15, 2002).
333. Seee.g., Kreindler, supra note 9.
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international law." 3 The moderate reading would be that "fair
and equitable" requires "a higher standard of conduct more in
consonance with the objective of the treaty."335 Tecmed v.
Mexico 36 sets forth the broadest reading of the "fair and equitable
treatment" standard, which requires that states not violate investor
expectations.
Siemens v. Argentina provides a useful survey of "fair and
equitable treatment":
In their ordinary meaning, the terms "fair" and "equitable"
mean "just," "even-handed," "unbiased," and "legitimate". ...
It follows from the ordinary meaning of "fair" and "equitable"
and the purpose and object of the Treaty [to intensify economic
cooperation and create favorable conditions for investments]
that these terms denote treatment in an even-handed and just
manner, conducive to fostering the promotion and protection of
foreign investment and stimulating private initiative.... Terms
such as "promote" or "stimulate" are action words that indicate
that it is the intention of the varties to adhere to conduct in
accordance with such purposes.
"Just" is the first word used to define the ordinary meaning of
"fair and equitable treatment." "[J]ust manner" only strengthens
this connection. Unjust enrichment is based on the idea of "just."
By definition, the enrichment must be unjust to qualify in the
merits stage. The "fair and equitable treatment" standard, if
nothing else, seeks to ensure that the host State treats the
investment in a "just manner." Benefiting unjustly from the
investment, then, must violate the "fair and equitable treatment"
standard. Consequently, if the standard is violated literally, there
must be a legitimate cause of action for unjust enrichment
contained within the standard.
Furthermore, this definitional approach is bolstered by the
argument that unjust enrichment violates customary international
law. The Siemens Tribunal continued:
There is no reference to international law or to a minimum
standard [in definition of fair and equitable in the BIT].
334. Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8 $ 290 (2007)
(Germany/Argentina BIT).
335. Id.
336. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico, ICSID Case No
ARB(AF)/00/2, IIC 247 154 (2003) (Award).
337. See Siemens, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/8 299.
338. Id. 1 290 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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However, in applying the Treaty, the Tribunal is bound to find
the meaning of these terms under international law bearing in
mind their ordinary meaning, the evolution of international law
and the specific context in which they are used. 139
The Tribunal added:
The question whether fair and equitable treatment is or is not
additional to the minimum treatment requirement under
international law is a question about the substantive content of
fair and equitable treatment. In 1927, the US-Mexican Mixed
Claims Commission considered in the Neer case that a State has
breached the fair and equitable treatment obligation when the
conduct of the State could be qualified as outrageous, egregious
or in bad faith or so below international standards that a
reasonable and impartial person would easily recognize it as
such. This description of conduct in breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard has been considered as the
expression of customary international law at that time. For the
Tribunal the question is whether, at the time the treaty was
concluded, customary international law had evolved to a higher
standard of treatment. 34
The Siemens Tribunal also described a narrow reading in another
case where "an international minimum standard.., could only be
breached by 'a willful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action
falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad
faith.' 341
Later tribunals adopted a more "modern," or perhaps,
moderate reading. "To the modern eye, what is unfair or
inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.
In particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and
inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith." "
Recent interpretations go even further, moving to the broad
interpretation. For example, according to Waste Management v.
Mexico:
[T]he minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable
treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the state and
harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly
339. Id. 291.
340. Id. T 293.
341. Id. 9 294 (quoting Genin v. Republic of.Estonia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/99/2, 367 (2001) (Award)).
342. Id. $ 295 (quoting Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/2, 123 (2002) (Award)).
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unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the
claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety-as might be the case with a manifest failure of
natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of
transparency and candour in the administrative process. In
applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in
breach of representations made by the host State which were
reasonably relied on by the claimant. '
Tecmed v. Mexico reflects this new standard, describing "just and
equitable treatment" as requiring "treatment that does not affect
the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment." 'Mihaly l's unjust enrichment claim fits into the moderate and
broad "fair and equitable treatment" standards. The narrow
standard, based on customary international law from the 1920s, is
a more difficult case.
Under the broad "investor's expectations" standard, "fair and
equitable treatment" becomes a catchall clause within the BIT.
This interpretation allows broad judicial discretion, as investor
expectations are myriad and subjective. Thus, an unjust
enrichment claim fits effortlessly. Mihaly l's expectations that its
project plans not be exploited by Sri Lanka without compensation
would place unjust enrichment within the ambit of "fair and
equitable" standard. Also, as most countries allow some type of
cause of action to prevent unjust enrichment, 5 Mihaly 1 could
point to its expectation that local laws prohibiting unjust
enrichment be followed. Consequently, Mihaly 1 had the BIT
supported right to expect that Sri Lanka not be enriched at its
expense.Mihaly l's expectations as an investor coupled with the
definitional argument regarding "just" standards and "unjust"
enrichment give Mihaly 1 a solid claim.
Over and above the preceding arguments, the moderate,
"modern" fair and equitable treatment standard requires
demonstrating that unjust enrichment violates customary
international law. Here, referencing instances where the Iran-U.S.
343. Id. 297 (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3, 91 98 (2004) (Award)).
344. Id. 1 298 (quoting Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 154 (2003) (Award)).
345. See Section II(A)(1) on Domestic Legal Codes at page 106 for examples.
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Claims Tribunal and current ICSID tribunals employ unjust
enrichment is key. First, Mihaly 1 could highlight the treatment of
unjust enrichment by tribunals like Enron 3and CME, " including
the ambiguities employed to avoid applying unjust enrichment
ICSID. Mihaly 1 can then easily point to ADC v. Hungary' as an
example of an ICSID tribunal using unjust enrichment-both by
awarding restitution and in its unspoken reliance on unjust
enrichment. Last, Mihaly 1 claimants could point to the options
granted by Chorz6w, " so often cited as customary international
law, as grounds for accepting a claim of unjust enrichment under a
BIT. Once the tribunal accepts that unjust enrichment is a
violation of customary international law, Mihaly 1 can move on to
proving that unjust enrichment in fact occurred.
Mihaly 1 stumbles, however, under the narrow "bad faith"
reading of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Here, Mihaly
1 must show bad faith on the part of Sri Lanka. An example might
be Sri Lanka intentionally sabotaging the contract in order to keep
the power plant profits. This would be a breach of good faith,
which might bar an unjust enrichment claim as any other available
cause of action preempts unjust enrichment. Alternatively, if Sri
Lanka had no intention of creating the plant, or a new government
subsequently decided to use the plans, Mihaly 1 would most likely
fail to get jurisdiction under the narrow "fair and equitable
treatment" standard because Sri Lanka had not acted in bad faith.
Assuming that the tribunal applied the moderate or broad
interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, Mihaly
1 will succeed in getting jurisdiction as: (1) the initial outlay for the
power plant design was an investment under the Washington
Convention customary standards and the BIT language; (2) there
was a dispute (3) arising directly from the investment (Sri Lanka's
enrichment resulted from its utilization of Mihaly l's plans); and
(4) the dispute was legal, as Mihaly 1 was able to point to a
violation of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard in the
relevant BIT.
346. Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 (U.S.-Arg.
2004) (Decisions on Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/.
347. CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL
Arbitration proceedings (2003).
348. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award) 484.
349. Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
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2. Merits
Because obtaining jurisdiction requires an exploration of the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard, the merits of the unjust
enrichment claim would, perforce, have to be decided in the
jurisdictional analysis. Here, the concern of Mihaly 1 is to provide
evidence of the unjust gain and ,not the loss it suffered. Mihaly l's
loss is relevant only insofar as it was directly connected to Sri
Lanka's gain. Mihaly 1 must prove:
An enrichment of one party to the detriment of the other, and
both must arise as a consequence of the same act or event.
There must be no justification for the enrichment and no
contractual or other remedy available to the injured party
whereby he might seek compensation from the party
enriched.350
In the instant case, Mihaly 1 can show that Sri Lanka was
enriched to Mihaly 1's detriment. First, Sri Lanka did not have to
pay for the power plant design and is now benefiting from more
power and the profits there from. Mihaly 1 can then show that it
created the plant designs, which were subsequently appropriated
without compensation, and it thus suffered a loss. It need not show
that the loss was sizeable or comparable to the remedy
requested-since a gains-based remedy is employed. Mihaly 1 will
then demonstrate that there was no justification for the
enrichment (such as fraud on its part, state of necessity, or some
other legal defense or reason given by Sri Lanka). Last, Mihaly 1
will show that no other remedy is available. This can accomplished
by pointing out that no contract exists, and therefore the integrity
of the contract is not undermined. Mihaly 1 may have to
distinguish its claim from an expropriation claim. This is possible
by noting the attenuated nature of an expropriation claim of
purely (unpatented) intellectual property, rather than a contract or
physical asset, the majority of which was created in an unrelated
country.
The merits will directly impact jurisdiction, as proving a
violation of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard requires
proving that an unjust enrichment, as defined by international law
standards, occurred. Since the case is argued in terms of gain, the
remedy must also reflect the defendant's unjust gain.
350. Sea-Land Serv., Inc, 6 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. at 30.
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3. Remedy
The real advantage of an unjust enrichment case in an
intellectual property context is the remedy available. Often, gains
from intellectual property ("IP") far exceed the initial outlay-
particularly in contributions of know-how. A remedy based on the
other party's gain, then, is ideal for the claimant. Some scholars, as
well as the U.S. government, see restitution of the defendant's gain
as the best way to award remedies in IP disputes. Indeed, The U.S.
Department of Justice asserts that restitution is mandated for a
number of IP violations. 5 James W. Hill, author of Trade Secrets,
Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, argues
that trade secret law, a type of intellectual property, should be
based on unjust enrichment.3 2 He argues that damages are
insufficient because of the difficulty in approximating the
claimant's loss and because the claimant often suffers little loss
relative to the defendant's undeserved gain. "'
Restitution provides a range of options that vary with the
facts of the case and judicial discretion. For example, in Mihaly 1
the tribunal could award Mihaly 1 a percentage of the profits from
the Sri Lankan power plant. This percentage might correspond to
the value of the plans relative to the power plant's total value,
including future profits. "' The foregoing remedy would reflect the
ADC v. Hungary award, 5' less the amount awarded for dividends
and the unpaid management contract fees. It is preferable that the
tribunal limit the award to the percentage of real profits for two
reasons. First, Mihaly 1 did not expend anything building the plant
whereas Sri Lanka did. Second, future profits are speculative. The
author of Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, Daniel
Friedmann, suggests that where a defendant's contribution entails
a loss or expenditure while constituting a major element that led to
the benefit, the defendant's expenditures should be considered. 356
351. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes VIII.D.1 (3d ed.
2006).
352. See generally James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the
Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1999).
353. See id. l 55-123.
354. See Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r (Kentucky Cave Case), 265 Ky. 418 (1936).
(awarding neighbor a corresponding share of profits of owner's cave tourist industry
where one third of the scenic cave extended under the neighbor's land).
355. See supra Part II.B.3.
356. DANIEL FRIEDMANN, RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS - THE MEASURE OF
RECOVERY (2001), available at
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Since restitution of profits does not entitle the plaintiff to recover
the defendant's gross revenue, awarding a percentage of the
profits allows the defendant to deduct his expenses in producing
the gain. "' Even awarding all profits is better for a defendant than
awarding the entire value of the investment.
Awarding a percentage of profits is consistent with the
restitution award in ADC"' and encourages development while
minimizing waste. Awarding the entire profit has precedents both
in Snepp v. United States3.9 and perhaps in Question II of
Chorz6w." In Snepp, a CIA agent published a book without
getting permission from the CIA. 36' The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the agent had to disgorge all profits
realized from the publication of the book, even though he had
contributed much of the work. 2 Friedmann explained:
[T]here is a venerable line of equity cases that have allowed
recovery of profits for breach of fiduciary duty even where the
defendant acted innocently and was unaware of the fact that his
conduct was wrongful. In these cases, once the defendant's
conduct was characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty, his
good faith, as well as his contribution, were often disregarded,
and he was held liable to hand over all his profits despite the
fact that these were mostly the result of his efforts and skill. 361
More recent cases explored by Friedmann, however, such as
Boardman v. Phipps, mitigate earlier decisions requiring
disgorgement of all profits. "
Friedmann concludes that there are four options for unjust
enrichment awards:
(1) The plaintiff will receive all profits, subject only to a
deduction of the defendant's investment in money or
property. 365-Such a result has often been reached in cases of
http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/restitution/friedman.pdf.
357. Id. at 1890.
358. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award).
359. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
360. See Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
361. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
362. Id. at 515-516.
363. FRIEDMANN, supra note 356, at 1897.
364. Boardman v. Phipps, [1966] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L. 1967) (appeal taken from Court of
Appeal) (holding that defendants were required to disgorge their profits but were entitled
to quantum meruit "on a liberal scale" for their work and skills).
365. FRIEDMANN, supra note 356.
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breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) The same result as under (1) except that the defendant will
be remunerated for his skill, ingenuity, risks undertaken, and
labor (quantum meruit).-This remuneration is based on the
market value of his contribution. The defendant will similarly
be paid for the use of any other resources that he invested.66
(3) The profits will be divided between the plaintiff and the
defendant in accordance with their relative contribution. -This
is a common solution in the "mixed fund" situation (monies of
both parties were used in a successful venture). It is, however,
submitted that such a result might be warranted in appropriate
circumstances for certain cases in which the defendant's
contribution was through labor, ingenuity, risk undertaken, and
skill.
(4) The plaintiff will receive the market value of that which was
taken from him. -Profits in excess of this amount will remain in
the hands of the defendant. Such a result is the opposite of that
reached under (1). 367
Moreover, the option granted in the award may depend on the
defendant's innocence:
Section 10 of the ALI Draft [of the Restatement (3d) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment] adopts a very liberal
approach towards the mistaken improver subject so that the
remedy given to the improver will not unduly prejudice the
owner. This approach is, however, confined to the mistaken
improver. The lot of the conscious wrongdoer is apparently
much harsher. His whole investment is forfeited.
Thus, suppose that D enters P's land, removes timber, causes it
to be cut, hauled, and sawn, thus producing lumber that is much
more valuable than the standing timber. If D was a conscious
trespasser, then under the ALI Draft he has no claim for the
benefit officiously conferred on P. 368
The award granted Mihaly 1, therefore, will vary according to
Sri Lanka's innocence and contribution. Suppose, for the sake of
analysis, that Mihaly l's power plant design was worth $1 million,
the power plant cost Sri Lanka $399 million to build, and the
operation of the plant generates annual profits of $5 million.
Under the first of Friedmann's options, Mihaly 1 receives all
profits after reimbursing Sri Lanka for the monetary amount it
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1925.
368. Id. at 1907 (footnotes omitted).
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invested. This option may occur where Sri Lanka intentionally
avoids entering into the contract in order to exploit Mihaly l's
plans. It is not a good option, however, as it provides a windfall to
the plaintiff. As well, under this option, unjust enrichment as
understood by Birks and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal would not
apply because there is a breach of good faith. " This breach allows
for an alternative cause of action-wrongful enrichment-thus
foreclosing an unjust enrichment claim.
Under the second option, Mihaly 1 receives the $5 million
dollars and future profits, and will reimburse Sri Lanka for all of
its expenses in building the power plant (money, property, "skill,
ingenuity, risks undertaken, and labor"). Sri Lanka will thus get its
$399 million back, but not share in any of the profits.
Under the third option, Mihaly 1 and Sri Lanka split the
profits in proportion to their respective investments. Thus, Mihaly
1 receives 1/400 of the profits. Considering the difficulty in valuing
intellectual property, the Tribunal may find that Mihaly's design
was worth more than its market value and award Mihaly 1 a larger
percentage of the profits.
The fourth option is the most favorable to Sri Lanka. Sri
Lanka retains the $5 million in annual profits after compensating
Mihaly 1 the $1 million market value for the plant design. This
solution might be desirable where Sri Lanka was unaware that the
design was not theirs to keep. An example might be where a new
government comes in and innocently uses the design.
Friedmann accurately summarizes the matrix a court should
employ:
If the defendant was a conscious wrongdoer and his
contribution consisted mainly of his own skill and labor, the
court may deny him any compensation. However, in extreme
cases in which his skill and labor created most of the benefit,
some allowance might be made. The defendant's case is even
stronger where he made an actual expenditure that contributed
to the benefit. Allowance should be made for such contribution
even in the case of conscious wrongdoer, though the court
should have discretion to allow it only in part. "0
Understanding the incentives that remedies create is
important. For example, in Mihaly,37' the investor's costs are sunk
369. See supra Part II.A.2.
370. FRIEDMANN, supra note 356, at 1909 (footnote omitted).
371. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310.
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unless Sri Lanka builds the plant. If disgorgement of all profits was
an available reined, Sri Lanka would be dissuaded from building
the plant, potentially leaving a complete loss the country. If,
however, the remedy available limited the amount of restitution to
a proportional interest, it would encourage building while not
dissuading investors from pre-contractual expenses. Sri Lanka
would also be less inclined to avoid signing contracts. This
situation is beneficial to both country and investor. On the other
hand, awards that are too low provide dangerous incentives for
countries to misappropriate the investor's money and skill, paying
only if the project succeeds. 372 This point is moot, however, if the
country lacks the funds to develop the project.
C. Other Hypotheticals: Finer Points
Having explored the most straightforward case, the second
hypothetical, "Mihaly 2," considers complicating factors. Assume
the same facts except that a third party, not Sri Lanka, built the
power plant. Four potential third-party beneficiary scenarios
require exploration:
(a) The third party paid a large sum to Sri Lanka to obtain the
power plant plans and knew that the plans were Mihaly 2's.
(b) The third party paid a large sum to Sri Lanka to obtain the
power plant plans but did not know that the plans were Mihaly
2's.
(c) The third party obtained the plans for free and knew that
the plans were Mihaly 2's.
(d) The third party obtained the plans for free but did not know
that the plans were Mihaly 2's.
In scenarios (a) and (b), a claim for unjust enrichment should
prevail against Sri Lanka for the amount Sri Lanka received in
372. The availability of a restitutionary remedy may encourage persons to, for
example, make licensing agreements with trade-secret owners, instead of the remedy
serving as a substitute for such market transactions. In fact, in intellectual property, the
restitution of benefits conferred may be regarded as a "more fundamental" right than the
liability for harm done to a creator. See Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts,
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 472 (1992) ("[I]n the
intellectual property setting, giving creators restitutionary rights tends to encourage
consensual markets."); See also Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953)
("Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent intention of the
parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are
obligations created by law for reasons of justice.").
[Vol. 31:501
Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored
exchange for the plans.373 In both cases, the seller, Sri Lanka,
benefited directly from Mihaly 2's plans. If, however, the buyer
profited exponentially after purchasing the plans, it is unlikely that
Mihaly 2 would be able to recover any of the buyer's profits. An
innocent third party has the "bona fide purchase for value without
notice" defense.37" As well, Mihaly 2 would struggle to find
jurisdiction for such a claim, as the causal connection between the
dispute and the investment required under the Washington
Convention would be stretched. Moreover, the third party is most
likely not a signatory to the BIT. This problem is explored in an
auxiliary manner in Saluka. There, the tribunal held that an fnjust
enrichment claim failed because the entity directly enriched was a
company, leaving the country only indirectly enriched from its
interests in the company.375 Saluka may impose interesting
limitations on unjust enrichment claims because it could require
future tribunals to decide both whether claims may be levied
against State companies and how much interest the respondent
State must have in the enriched company to be considered directly
enriched.
Scenario (c) is a company in which the State has some
interests. Under Saluka, the amount of Sri Lanka's interest in the
company will be the determinative factor for both the jurisdiction
and the merits. For example, a purely State-owned company
resembles the facts in Mihaly 1, where an unjust enrichment claim
would easily gain jurisdiction and win on the merits.
If the company is not wholly owned by the state, the other
shareholders may not know of the enrichment. A successful unjust
enrichment claim, however, does not require that the defendant
know of the unjust enrichment. In this instance, an unjust
enrichment claim may succeed. Even under Saluka, a controlling
interest should be enough to prove that the State was a direct
beneficiary-although this may lead to problems of piercing the
corporate veil.
If Sri Lanka has minority interests in the company that
receives and develops the Mihaly 2 designs, Mihaly 2 bleeds. In
this instance, the Saluka precedent prevents an unjust enrichment
373. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award); supra Part II.B.3.
374. See supra Part II.A.2.
375. See Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, $J 271-78 (Partial Award,
registered with Perm Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006).
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claim. This is a hard call, particularly given that unlike Saluka,
recent ICSID decisions refuse to separate entitlement to share
value for shareholders from the amount of damage that the
company suffered directly. Cases like Gami, 6 Enron,3" and
CMS..8 liken a drop in company share value to expropriation and
allow the shareholder to recover the loss. True, these decisions
arise in contexts other than unjust enrichment. Nevertheless, they
present an interesting counter-point to Saluka. It would be odd to
say that an increase in the value of a company's shares, wherein Sri
Lanka receives a portion of the profits, is not an enrichment to Sri
Lanka. This is especially so when other cases have awarded
minority shareholders company lost profits. Perhaps, then, Mihaly
2 could get a portion of the dividends or some of Sri Lanka's
shares in the beneficiary company. Since unjust enrichment
doesn't require intent, the same would apply to scenario (d).
Mihaly designed the power plant specifically for Sri Lanka.
What if Mihaly had designed a fungible product? Assume that
"Mihaly 3" had an option to sell the design to another country.
Assuming we use the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal unjust enrichment
requirements, for Mihaly 3 to have an unjust enrichment claim
against Sri Lanka, Mihaly 3 must suffer some loss. While not all
countries require a corresponding loss, a correlated loss serves to
exclude claims for perfectly fungible intellectual property, such as
computer programs, which belong under the WTO regime."' In
the instant case, it would be up to judicial discretion as to whether
Mihaly 3 sustained a loss, either because it did not find a
replacement buyer or because there were losses incurred in finding
a new client.
Should the fact that "Mihaly 4" patented their design
influence the outcome? Because using a patent without permission
violates property laws, the claimant may not even need an unjust
376. See GAMI Invs. Inc. v. Mexico, 13 ICSID (W. Bank) 147, 175 (2004). (claiming
that Mexico's conduct impaired the value of its shareholdings to such an extent that it
must be deemed tantamount to an expropriation).
377. See Enron Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/3 (U.S.-Arg.
2004) (Decisions on Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/.
378. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/01/8 (May 2005).
379. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods pt. II art. 10, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. ("Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).").
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enrichment cause of action. Rather, Mihaly 4 may sue under an
expropriation claim. Indeed, under the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
standards, the claimant would be barred from bringing an unjust
enrichment claim because another cause of action is available,
expropriation. Using intellectual property in isolation, however,
may not constitute expropriation. Regardless, Mihaly 4 could ask
for the award to be based on unjust enrichment-relying on
ADC3n and Chorz6w. 8'
A subtler problem arises during negotiations. At what point is
the information gleaned from an extended negotiation considered
unjust enrichment to the State if the State later capitalizes on the
information without entering into a contract? States might use
negotiations to gratuitously derive the necessary know-how and
intellectual legwork for a new project. Allowing unjust enrichment
claims in this scenario might prevent blatant information mining
and preserve good faith and openness in negotiations.
Timing is another area requiring exploration. The ad hoc
committee in Amco held that res judicata limitations do not apply
to subsequent unjust enrichment actions." Thus, if Mihaly failed
under the 2006 claim, it could sue a few years later under unjust
enrichment once Sri Lanka developed the power plant based on
Mihaly designs. This is an area that will require fine-tuning
because repeat claims are an inefficient use of judicial resources.
380. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. The Republic of Hungary (Cyprus v. Hung.) (W. Bank)
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (2006) (Award) 484.
381. See Factory at Chorz6w, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17.
382. See Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/1 (U.S.-
Indon. 1990) (Resubmitted Case: Decision on Jurisdiction). ("The Tribunal here refers
also to Indonesia's contention .... that no unjust enrichment claim may be advanced by
AMCO because this would create 'a seemingly new argument to evade the legal force of
res judicata.' But unjust enrichment was never the subject matter of a finding by the first
Tribunal, as although the issue had been advanced before that body, it reached its
pertinent findings on other grounds. Even if the present Tribunal had found that the
statement of the ad hoc Committee on the lawfulness of the license revocation was res
judicata, the claim of unjust enrichment could still be advanced in the present
proceedings.") This raises a number of issues. For instance, tribunals must explore unjust
enrichment claims and dismiss them with valid justifications, or risk retrying cases. If
unjust enrichment escapes res judicata, and is considered a valid cause of action, then
countries risk retrial or lengthened trials, and claimants should be exploiting this
opportunity.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Increasing recognition of the value of intellectual property
will prompt more claims that could, and probably should, employ
unjust enrichment. Avoiding unjust enrichment may become
increasingly problematic as tribunals scramble to find substitute
rhetoric for a concept easily identified as unjust enrichment. This is
not to say that unjust enrichment should be employed liberally.
Equitable remedies require rigid parameters to protect the
integrity of legal concepts and contracts, and to prevent the misuse
that current ICSID pleadings demonstrate.
The international legal community should achieve a level of
comfort with the use of unjust enrichment as a cause of action.
Unjust enrichment will soon reemerge in international investment
disputes, and when it does, it will be far better for the community
at large if the claim has universally applicable tenets. Indeed, ADC
v. Hungary has already opened the door. As Chorzow, Lena
Goldfields, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, recent ICSID cases, and
scholarly treatises show, unjust enrichment is a general principle of
international law and has been since the early twentieth century.
Further, the fair and equitable treatment standard, which most
BITs contain, protects customary international law. 383 Thus, unjust
enrichment is protected by the "fair and equitable treatment"
standard in BITs. As the Mihaly hypothetical series shows, unjust
enrichment meets ICSID jurisdictional thresholds, and meets a
legal need inherent in increasingly prevalent intellectual property
cases.
In the end, there is a space for unjust enrichment in ICSID. A
silent player in customary international law, housed within "fair
and equitable" treatment, and fulfilling all of the ICSID
jurisdictional criteria, unjust enrichment is simply awaiting the
right set of facts and a disciplined application.
383. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Working Papers on
International Investment, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law (Sept. 2004), Introduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.
